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This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay is titled “Speculative Dynamics
I: Imperfect Competition, and the Implications for High Frequency Trading”. In this essay,
I analyze the nature of imperfect competition among informed traders who continuously
generate and exploit private information about a risky asset’s liquidation value which follows
either a mean reverting process or random walk. I find the following results: (i) The combined
trading of multiple informed traders is much more aggressive than the monopolistic trader in
Chau and Vayanos (2008). (ii) The equilibrium price is even more revealing of the informed
trader’s private information. (iii) Market depth improves as the number of informed traders
increases. (iv) In the limit of continuous trading, market is strong form efficient while
aggregate profits of the informed traders remain bounded away from zero, in sharp contrast to
the corresponding results in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), and Foster and Viswanathan
(1993). (vi) Informed traders’ inventories follows a Brownian motion, therefore enabling
them to contribute significantly to total trading volume and price variance. These results
shed light on empirical findings regarding high frequency traders by helping explain why
they remain profitable despite aggressive competition with each other, why their trading
volume is very high, to what extent they improve efficiency, and through what mechanism
they improve liquidity.
The second essay is titled “Speculative Dynamics II: Asymmetric Informed Traders”. In
this essay, I study the strategic interaction between hierarchical duopolistic informed traders
who continuously generate and exploit private information about a risky asset’s liquidation
value, which follows either a mean reverting process or random walk. I find the following
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expected profits may fall but converges to a strictly positive constant in the limit.
The third essay is titled “Real Options and Product Differentiation”. In this essay, I de-
velop a continuous time real investment model in an oligopoly industry where the products
are heterogenous. Although the heterogenous products assumption can lower each firm’s
incentive to exercise the growth options prematurely, the preemption strategy is still prof-
itable.
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Speculative Dynamics I: Imperfect Competition, and the Implications for
High Frequency Trading
1.1 Introduction
Fama (1970) suggests that in a strong form efficient market, price reflects all public and
private information. Will it be possible for traders with superior private information to
earn strictly positive expected profits in a strong-form efficient market? Holden and Subrah-
manyam (1992) and Foster and Viswanathan (1993) find that this is not possible and instead
they reach a Bertrand-like result1. The intuition is that if there are two or more strategic
traders receiving the same private information, each trader tries to preempt the others with
the result that information is revealed almost instantaneously and each trader’s expected
profits quickly dissipate to zero in the limit of continuous trading. Surprisingly, Chau and
Vayanos (2008) find that positive expected profits are possible while the market is strong
form efficient. A monopolistic informed trader privately observes the flow of information
and chooses to trade aggressively on her information to push the price towards her valuation
of the asset2. In the limit, the information asymmetry disappears but the insider’s profits
1The informed traders in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) and Foster and Viswanathan (1993) submit
market orders to the market maker instead of a demand schedule. The intuition is similar to that of Back
and Paulsen (2009), in which each firm tries to preempt other firms by investing earlier with the result that
the value of growth options equal to zero and the outcome is competitive.
2According to Chau and Vayanos (2008), the monopolist is “impatient” for three reasons: (1) time
discounting, (2) public revelation of information, (3) mean-reversion of profitability.
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converge to a positive constant. A similar result can also be found in Hellwig (1982) in
which competitive informed traders submit market order conditioning on past prices. Even
as the time interval between trades converges to zero, insiders can make positive returns
while pushing the price to an arbitrarily closed to the efficient value. The difference among
these models depends on the arrival of private information. Holden and Subrahmanyam
(1992) and Foster and Viswanathan (1993) follow the assumptions in Kyle (1985) in which
private information is one-shot and the asset’s value is fixed. The private information is
received when the trading session starts and there is a predetermined date when information
is publicly announced and the asset is liquidated. In Chau and Vayanos (2008), the informed
trader receives new information repeatedly, the fundamental value of the asset is stochastic,
and trading takes place over an infinite horizon.
It is reasonable to believe that in actual financial markets, there are several information-
aly large strategic investors consistently generating new information and trading to profit
from the information. In this paper, I study the nature of imperfect competition among
those traders. One of the purposes is to examine how imperfect competition and repeated
arrivals of private information affect market efficiency, market liquidity, trading volume, price
volatility, and the profitability of informed traders, especially relative to the monopolistic
case in Chau and Vayanos’ model and the oligoplistic case in Holden and Subrahmanyam
(1992) and Foster and Viswanathan (1993). The other purpose of this paper is to shed
light on high frequency trading by examining the properties of equilibrium in the limit of
continuous trading. The paper can explain why high frequency traders3 remain profitable
3According to Chlistalla (2011), there are three types of high frequency traders: (i) electronic market
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despite aggressive competition with one another, why they contribute a significant portion
to trading volume and price volatility, and to what extent do those traders improve market
efficiency and add to market liquidity.
In the model, there is a riskless bond and a risky asset. The liquidation value of the risky
asset which follows a stochastic process can only be observed by informed traders. Like the
“market order” model in Kyle (1985), multiple identically informed strategic traders and
exogenous liquidity traders execute batched market orders against competitive risk neutral
market makers. The informed traders receive new information each period and trading takes
place until the asset is liquidated at a random date. I prove that there exists a unique
linear equilibrium, obtain the closed form solution up to a set of nonlinear equations, and
derive analytical forms when trading becomes continuous. Not surprisingly, the combined
trading of multiple informed traders is more aggressive than the monopolistic trader in
Chau and Vayanos, the equilibrium price is even more revealing of the informed trader’s
private information, and market depth improves as the number of informed traders increases.
Oligopolistic imperfect competition makes the informed traders trade more aggressively than
a monopolist, thus improving market efficiency and increasing aggregate trading volume. The
effects of imperfect competition on market depth is slightly more difficult to interpret since
it has two opposite effects. One the one hand, with increasing competition, initially the
net order flow will contain more information relative to the noise trading, and therefore the
adverse selection is more severe and market depth is worse. On the other hand, as market
becomes more efficient, there is less private information contained in the order flow, thus
making; (ii) statistical arbitrage strategies; (iii) liquidity detection.
3
improving market depth. In the stationary state, I show that the second effect dominates
and imperfect competition among informed traders makes market deeper, thus improving
liquidity.
Surprisingly, the model uncovers some important but unexpected results in the limit as
the time interval between trades goes to zero. The first result is that the variance of the
private information held by informed traders goes to zero at a rate proportional to the time
interval between rounds of trading. This is much faster than the corresponding strong from
efficiency result in the Chau and Vayanos’ model, where the convergence rate is proportional
to the square root of the time interval between rounds of trading. The second result is that
the aggregate profits of the informed traders remain bounded away from zero. As the number
of informed traders increases, their aggregate profits fall, tending to zero only as the number
of informed traders becomes large. To be more specific, the aggregate profits near continuous
trading is inversely proportional to the square root of the number of informed traders. The
result has the flavor of Cournot competition, not the flavor of Bertrand competition found in
the one-shot private information model of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) and Foster and
Viswanathan (1993). The third result concerns volume and volatility. The trading volume4
of informed traders over ∆t is of order
√
∆t, the same magnitude as the trading volume
of liquidity traders. This implies that in the limit informed traders make a non-negligible
contribution to total trading volume and thus price volatility, and the fraction converges to
one as the number of informed traders becomes large. The result is novel since in almost all
4Trading volume is not well defined in continuous time Kyle’s model since total variation of Brownian
motion over any finite time is infinite.
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the continuous time market microstructure model with price impact (Kyle’s model and many
extensions), the contributions to trading volume and price volatility by informed traders is
negligible compared to the contributions of liquidity traders.
The results near continuous trading can help explain some empirical findings regard-
ing high frequency trading. In recent years, financial markets have witnessed rapid growth
in high frequency trading5, made possible by the evolution of technology. High frequency
traders are a subset of algorithmic traders. Those traders apply mathematical algorithms
to either public or private statistical information, and they use fast computers to implement
the algorithms, transmitting orders in a few milliseconds or less. High frequency traders
contribute significantly to trading volume6. Despite aggressive competition with one an-
other, high frequency traders remain profitable7. Kirilenko et al. (2011) document that high
frequency traders are consistently profitable. They even turned a profit on the day on May
6, 2010 Flash Crash.
I focus on the type of high frequency traders who are pursuing low latency statistical
arbitrage strategies. According to Chlistalla (2011), these traders “seek to correlate be-
tween assets and try to profit from the imbalance in these correlations”. It might not be
appropriate to label those traders as “informed” if one defines information as corporate news
on “merger and acquisition decisions” or “content of earnings announcements”. However,
5As pointed out by Duhigg in Stock Traders Find Speed Pays, in Milliseconds (New York Times, July
23, 2009), “Average daily volume has soared by 164 percent since 2005, according to data from NYSE. ...,
stock exchanges say that a handful of high-frequency traders now account for more than half of all trades.”
6In “The Real Story of Trading Software Espionage” (AdvancedTrading.com, July 10, 2009), Iati mentions
that “High-frequency trading firms, which represent approximately 2% of the trading firms operating in the
U.S. markets today, account for 73% of all U.S. equity trading volume.”
7Iati’s article states that “TABB group estimates that annual aggregate profits of low-latency arbitrage
strategies exceed $21 billion, spread out among the few hundred firms that deploy them.”
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if those traders are faster and better than average market participants in gathering and
processing information on order flows and price movements on the security and any other
correlated securities to generate private signals which they can profit from, it is reasonable
to call them “informed”8. At first glance, it appears that Chau and Vayanos (2008) can be
a good model for those high frequency statistical arbitrageurs. Although their model has
good insights on market efficiency and profitability, it does not explain trading volume and
market liquidity. The fraction of trading volume of the monopolistic informed trader in Chau
and Vayanos is essentially zero in the limit of continuous trading, and the market becomes
less liquid as the frequency of trading increases. Their model does not address the question
of what happens to high frequency traders’ profits if they compete very aggressively with
each other. By focusing on imperfect competition in a non-cooperative duopolistic setting,
I am able to show that high frequency traders incorporate private signals into prices much
faster than in Chau and Vayanos’ model, high frequency traders add to market liquidity
by competing aggressively with each other, they contribute significantly to trading volume,
and most important of all, those traders remain profitable despite exploiting from the same
information set and implementing the same algorithms.
After the flash crash of May 6, 2010, a recent policy proposal suggests that batching
orders less frequently can reduce the participation rate and profits of high frequency traders
and improve market depth. My model suggests that such a regulation would have the
opposite effect of reducing liquidity. If each high frequency trader has to pay an entry cost
8Hendershott and Riordan (2011b) find that the market orders by high frequency traders have information
advantage.
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and operating cost, the number of high frequency traders might decrease with less frequent
order batching, with the result that less competition will lead to market being less liquid.
This paper belongs to the literature on strategic trading with asymmetric information.
In the pioneering work of Kyle (1985), a monopolistic insider uses liquidity traders as cam-
ouflage, reveals her private information gradually, and exploits her monopoly power over
time when facing a competitive risk neutral market maker. In the subsequent extensions by
Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) and Foster and Viswanathan (1993), due to the imperfect
competition among identically informed traders, almost all private information is revealed
only after a few trading rounds. Foster and Viswanathan (1994) replace homogenous private
information with a hierarchical information structure to study learning among strategic in-
formed traders. Foster and Viswanathan (1996) relax the assumption even further to allow
for a more general correlation structure among the signals received by multiple informed
traders. They show the initial correlation among the signals has a strong effect on the trad-
ing strategies and informativeness of prices. Traders initially compete aggressively on the
common part of the private information and later play a “waiting” game by making smaller
bets and trying to infer private information exclusive to others. Back et al. (2000) solve a
similar problem in continuous time and derive a closed-form solution.
The traders in my model exploit their private signals via market orders. Rosu (2009)
directly models the limit order book. He also finds a similar prediction that higher com-
petition causes smaller price impact. However, competition in his model is measured by
how fast traders arrive in the market whereas in my model, competition is measured by the
7
number of informed traders. In his model, traders trade for liquidity reasons and there is
no asymmetric information, whereas the motive for trade in my model comes from private
information.
Martinez and Rosu (2011) study a very similar problem. They tackle the problem directly
in setup similar to that of Back (1992) and focus on non-stationary equilibrium. In order
to generate linear equilibrium in continuous time, they assume an informed trader to have
uncertainty aversion regarding the level of the asset value (Informed traders care more about
the change in the value of asset than the level) and impose a technological constraint on the
market maker. My paper, on the other hand, does not require such assumptions and focuses
on stationary equilibrium.
In my model, high frequency traders are risk neutral. Therefore, the model cannot
explain the phenomenons that high frequency traders reverse their inventories frequently,
and move in and out of short-term positions very quickly. Future work may explain pattern
of mean-reverting inventories by making the traders risk averse instead of risk neutral.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, I describe the model, solve the linear
equilibrium, prove its uniqueness. Section III characterizes the equilibrium near continuous
trading. Section IV shows some comparative statics results and derives empirical implica-




I consider an economy with a single consumption good. There are a riskless bond with
zero interest rate and a non-dividend paying risky asset with a liquidation value vn which
evolves stochastically. Trading takes place from t = 0 to t = +∞ at the discrete points
tn (tn = nh), until the risky asset is liquidated where h is the time interval between the
auctions. At the end of each period, there is a probability 1 − exp (−rh) = rh + o(h2)
that the risky asset is liquidated. I further assume the riskless bonds are in perfectly elastic
supply. The liquidation value vn follows a mean-reverting process or random walk:
vn − vn−1 = κ(v̄ − vn−1)h+ εv,n. (1.1)
In the above specification, κ determines the adjustment speed of the liquidation value vn
to its long run fixed target v̄. κ is assumed to be greater than or equal to zero such that
the prices are stationary. If κ = 0, then vn follows a random walk. The innovation εv,n is
independently and normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2vh.
Assumption 2: Market Participants and Information Structure
The risk neutral market participants consist of a competitive market maker, M (M is a
positive integer) informed strategic traders, and a number of liquidity traders. The informed
traders are each assumed to be able to perfectly observe the liquidation value vn at each
period. Conditional on that the asset has not yet been liquidated at the beginning of the
nth period, I in ≡ {pτ , vτ |0 ≤ τ ≤ n} is each informed trader’s information set at t = nh, and
Imn = {pτ |τ ≤ n} is the market makers’ information set.
At each period, both the informed traders and liquidity traders submit market orders
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to the market maker. The liquidity traders’ order is denoted by un, which is normally
distributed with mean zero and variance σ2uh. I further assume un is uncorrelated with εv,n.
I denote the market order submitted by the jth informed trader at the nth period (t = nh)
by xj,n. In equilibrium, I should have x1,n = ... = xM,n = xn because of symmetry argument.
Assumption 3: Timing of events
I assume at the nth period, the informed traders and the noise traders submit their
demands before new information arrives. After submitting their market orders, the informed
traders observe εn and thus vn. The market maker observes the total order imbalance
yn =
∑M
j=1 xj,n +un, then sets the price pn equal to the expected value of the asset based on
the history of order flows, and takes the other side of the trade. At the end of the period,
there is a probability (1− exp (−rh)) that the liquidation value vn is public announced, the
risky asset is liquidated and investors profits are realized.
Pricing
Since the market maker is assumed to be competitive and risk neutral, therefore, at
period n she sets the price pn equal to the expected value of the asset after she receives the




(1− exp (−rh)) exp (−r(n′ − n)h)vn′|Imn−1, yn], (1.2)
where (1− exp (−rh)) exp (−r(n′ − n)h) is the probability that the asset is liquidated at the
end of the n′th period.
Lemma 1.2.1: The price pn is a linear function of the market maker’s expectation of
10
the current liquidation value of the risky asset E(vn|Imn ):
pn =
(1− exp (−rh))





Proof : See Appendix A.
Optimization
Suppose the risky asset were liquidated at a random future date νh. Given that the asset
has not been liquidated at nh < νh, the jth informed trader’s profits that accrue to her from
period n should equal to the difference between the value of her position (
∑
n≤τ≤ν vνxj,τ )










(1− exp(−rh)) exp(−r(n′ − n)h)(
n′∑
τ=n
xj,τ (vn′ − pτ ))
Since informed traders are risk neutral, at the nth period, the jth informed trader tries






(1− exp(−rh)) exp(−r(n′ − n)h)(
n′∑
τ=n
xj,τ (vn′ − pτ ))|I in−1]. (1.5)
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Proof : See Appendix A.
1.2.1 Equilibrium Concept
The equilibrium concept in this paper is similar to the previous literature. I follow Foster and
Viswanathan (1996) closely here and let Xj = (xj,1, ..., xj,ν) (for each j) and P = (p1, ..., pν)
represent the strategy functions were the asset liquidated at νh. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of the trading game is a M + 1 vector of strategies (X1, ..., XM , P ) such that:





E[πj,n(X1, ..., Xj, ..., XM , P )|I in−1] ≥ E[πj,n(X1, ..., X ′j, ..., XM , P )|I in−1] (1.7)
2. For all n = 1, ..., ν, I have
pn =
(1− exp (−rh))





Therefore, the market maker sets the price equal to the expected value of the risky asset
conditional on her information set inferred from the order flow. Each risk neutral informed
trader, taking as given the price process set by the market maker and the strategies of
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other informed traders, submits market orders to maximize the expected profits taking into
account the effect on the price.
I restrict attention to stationary linear Markov eqilibrium. In order to set the price pn
which takes a linear form in Equation (1.3), the market maker has to solve the inference
problem about vn. I then conjecture that informed trader j’s optimal strategy at period n is
to submit market orders which depend linearly on the pricing error defined as the difference
between vn−1 and the market maker’s conditional estimate v̂n−1 = E(vn−1|Imn−1), i.e.,
xj,n = βj(vn−1 − v̂n−1), (1.9)
to maximize her expected profits.
1.2.2 The Market Maker’s Inference Problem
To solve the market maker’s inference problem, I use Kalman filtering. Conjecture that at
the end of the (n−1)th period, the market maker believe vn−1 to be normally distributed with
mean v̂n−1 and variance Σv
9. Then, at the nth period, after observing the order imbalance
yn, the market maker updates her belief about vn−1 in the form of
vn−1 = E(vn−1|In−1) +
λ
1− κh




(Xn + un) + ηn,
9Σv is strictly greater than σ
2
vh since the informed traders observe εv,n−1 after they submit the market
order at the (n− 1)th period.
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where λ is the inference parameter for the market maker to be derived next. Since vn follows
a mean-reverting process (random walk if κ = 0) in Equation (1.1), vn has the following
expression:
vn = (1− κh)v̂n−1 + κhv̄ + λyn + (1− κh)ηn + εv,n. (1.11)
Therefore, the market maker’s posterior belief about vn is normally distributed with mean
E(vn|Imn ) = v̂n = (1− κh)v̂n−1 + κhv̄ + λyn (1.12)
and variance
var(vn|Imn ) = var((1− κh)ηn + εv,n) = (1− κh)2var(ηn) + σ2vh. (1.13)
Stationary condition requires that var(vn|Imn ) = Σv.
Lemma 1.2.3: Given the trading strategy of the informed traders defined in equation





and the variance of the market maker’s belief on vn satisfies the equation
(1− κh)2Σvσ2uh
M2β2Σv + σ2uh
+ σ2vh = Σv. (1.15)
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Proof : See Appendix A.
1.2.3 The Informed Traders’ Optimization Problem
At the beginning of each period, each informed trader submits market orders given the price
process generated by the market maker to maximize the present value of the expected profits
scaled by (1−exp (−rh))
1−exp (−rh)(1−κh) . The j






In the optimization, the informed trader takes account of how his trading and his estimate
of the trading by other market makers influence the market price, which equal to market
makers estimate v̂n. I conjecture that the value function for the j
th informed trader is
quadratic with respect to vn−1 − v̂n−1 and takes the form of
Vj,n = B(vn−1 − v̂n−1)2 + C. (1.17)
Later, I will prove the quadratic form is sustained and valid in Lemma 1.2.4. The value
function must satisfy the following Bellman equation:
V (vn−1, v̂n−1) = maxxnE[xn(vn − v̂n) + e−rhV (vn, v̂n)|I in−1]. (1.18)
The solution of the above Bellman equation is provided in the following theorem:
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Lemma 1.2.4: Given the price process set by the market maker, each informed trader’s
strategy (equation (1.9)) is characterized by a trading intensity parameter β, given by
β =
(1− 2e−rhBλ)(1− κh)
λ(M(1− 2e−rhBλ) + 1)
. (1.19)
Equation (1.18) has a quadratic solution of the form V (vn−1, v̂n−1) = B(vn−1 − v̂n−1)2 + C
where B and C satisfy the following set of equations:
B =
(1− κh)2(1− e−rhBλ)









Proof : See Appendix A.
1.2.4 Equilibrium
Proposition 1.2.1: There exists a unique linear Markovian equilibrium characterized by
five parameters λ, Σv, β, B and C which satisfy the system of five nonlinear equations:



































(M + 1)3 + (9− 18M)Z +
√





(M + 1)3 + (9− 18M)Z +
√
((M + 1)3 + (9− 18M)Z)2 + ((M + 1)2 − 3Z)3
and Z = e−rh(1− κh)2 < 1.
Proof : See Appendix A.
1.3 Asymptotic Properties of Equilibrium in the Limit of Continuous Trad-
ing
1.3.1 Research Questions
It is important to study how imperfect competition affects the properties of equilibrium,
especially when the frequency of trading becomes very high approaching to the limit of con-
tinuous trading. Firstly, it is intuitively to believe that increasing competition will make the
already “impatient” monopolistic trader in Chau and Vayanos (2008) even more “impatient”.
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The aggregate trading of multiple informed traders competing strategically should be more
aggressive than in the monopolist case. Chau and Vayanos find that when the time interval
between rounds of trading is small, the variance of private information not incorporated into
price Σv is proportional to
√
h. How does the more aggressive trading by informed traders
improve the convergent rate? Can the rate be of the same or higher order than
√
h?
Secondly, does more competition improve market depth or not? As shown in the non-
stationary setup in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), imperfect competition has two op-
posite effects. The market is less liquid in the beginning of the trading sessions since the net
order flow contains more private information relative to the noise. After most information
is revealed in the remaining of trading sessions, the market becomes very deep since price is
already very efficient and there is less information asymmetry between the informed traders
and market maker. It would be interesting to know which effect dominates in the stationary
state.
Thirdly, Foster and Viswanathan (1993) show that identically informed traders’ profits
converge to zero in a continuous trading limit since by trading more frequently the traders
have more opportunities to preempt each other. In their model and the model of Holden and
Subrahmanyam (1992), private information is one-shot and the liquidation value of the risky
asset is fixed. It is important to examine whether this Bertrand-like result still holds in the
model where private information arrives repeatedly and the value of the asset is stochastic.
In the steady state of this model, the informed traders earn zero profits if and only if the
price impact is zero10. The market maker cannot set price impact to zero because there is
10This is because the market maker sets price efficiently and informed traders benefit when the liquidity
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always new information coming in and the market maker has to learn from the net order
flow. As long as the price impact is strictly positive in the limit, informed traders’ profits
remain bounded away from zero.
Lastly, in almost all dynamic market microstructure models with price impact, the trading
volume contributed by the informed traders is negligible compared to the trading volume
of liquidity traders when trading is continuous. For the same reason, the fraction of price
volatility contributed by informed traders is also zero. Even though the monopolistic trader
in Chau and Vayanos trades very aggressively, his trading volume over a short interval h
is of order h
3
4
11, which is much smaller than
√
h contributed by the liquidity trader over
the same short period. In the presence of imperfect competition, the aggregate trading of
informed traders should be more aggressive relative to the monopolistic case. But it remains
to be shown whether the results will change qualitatively such that the trading volume of
the informed traders is comparable to the trading volume of liquidity traders. If so, informed
traders will also contribute significantly to price volatility as well.
To answer the above questions, I derive the asymptotic properties of the equilibrium near
continuous trading in the following theorem.
trader moves price away from its efficient value.
11Since trading intensity parameter β ∼
√
h and pricing error is of order h
1
4 , the trading volume over one




1.3.2 Asymptotic Properties of Equilibrium
Proposition 1.2.2: In the limit of continuous trading (h → 0), the asymptotic behaviors






















































(M + 1)3 − 18M − 9 +
√





(M + 1)3 − 18M − 9−
√
((M + 1)3 − 18M − 9)2 − (M2 + 2M − 2)3.
Proof : See Appendix A.
From the above theorem, the parameter which measures the uncertainty of the market
maker about the underlying profitability of the risky asset, Σv, converges to 0 when h goes
to 0. The value Σv is also the variance of private information not incorporated into price at
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each period. The notation Σv ∼ h means that all private information is reflected in the price,
information asymmetry disappears, and the market is strong form efficient when trading is
continuous. Although we reach the same conclusion regarding market efficiency as in Chau
and Vayanos’ model, there is still some difference in how efficient the price becomes or how
different the convergence rate is for small h. Since Σv ∼
√
h for the case of a monopolistic




the ratio converging to infinity when h → 0. Therefore, the equilibrium price with M ≥ 2
informed traders is even more revealing of the informed traders’ private information than the
monopolist case. We should also expect that trading intensity is qualitatively different. In
Chau and Vayanos, when there is only one monopolistic informed trader, β ∼
√
h. However,
β is of order 1 when the market is populated with multiple informed traders. This implies that
imperfect competition makes traders trade much more aggressively and bring information
into the price much more quickly. Therefore, market makers learn more from the order flows
and set more efficient price.
Next, I examine the trading volume contributed by informed traders to check whether
it is comparable to the trading volume of liquidity traders in continuous trading. One can
tell that β is of order 1 and |vn−1− v̂n−1| ∼
√
h. Then over one trading period, the absolute
aggregate trading volume of an informed trader |xn| = β|vn−1 − v̂n−1| is of order
√
h. Since
the trading volume contributed by liquidity trader is of the same order |un| = σu
√
h, it
follows that the informed traders generate a non-negligible fraction of total trading volume
because the ratio |Xn||un| converges to a positive constant bounded away from zero. The next
21
theorem derives the fraction of trading volume contributed by informed traders.
Proposition 1.2.3: In the continuous trading limit (h→ 0), define ξM to be the fraction







1− 2q0 + 1
(1.32)
which depends only on the number of informed traders.
In most dynamic models with price impact, the informed traders’ trade does not have a
diffusion component which contributes to volatility in the limit of continuous trading since
their fraction of trading volume is zero. In my model, as illustrated above, informed traders
contribute significantly to trading volume, and thus they should contribute significantly to
price volatility as well. It is trivial to write ∆pn as
∆pn = pn − pn−1 =
(1− exp (−rh))




1− exp (−rh)(1− κh)
λ(Mβ(vn−1 − v̂n−1) + un).












The next theorem illustrates the contribution of price variance by informed traders and
liquidity traders.
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Proposition 1.2.4: In the continuous trading limit (h→ 0), the price variance limh→0 V ar(∆pn)h










total price variance which is the sum of these two components, is ( r
r+κ
)2σ2v , independent of
the number of traders.























(M(1− 2q0)σ2u + σ2u)
= σ2v .
Finally, I examine each informed trader’s profitability. The expected profits can be
written as
(1− exp (−rh))
1− exp (−rh)(1− κh)
V (vn−1, v̂n−1) =
(1− exp (−rh))
1− exp (−rh)(1− κh)
(B(vn−1−v̂n−1)2+C). (1.36)
The term (vn−1 − v̂n−1)2 converges to 0 when h → 0. But (1−exp (−rh))1−exp (−rh)(1−κh)C converges to a
positive constant from Proposition 1.2.2. Hence, competition makes the aggregate profits
fall, but it does not drive profits to zero. The results are in sharp contrast with the ones
found in Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) and Foster and Viswanathan (1993) although
23
sharing a similar result in terms of market efficiency.
1.3.3 Properties of the Perfectly Competitive Equilibrium
I examine another class of asymptotic results by taking the limit as M goes to infinity. It
is easy to verify that when M → +∞, limM→∞M2q0 = 1. Then substituting 1M2 for q0 in
Proposition 1.2.2, I can derive the properties of the perfectly competitive equilibrium in the
limit of continuous trading in the next theorem.
Proposition 1.2.5: In the perfectly competitive case (i.e., when the number of traders






































ξM = 1 (1.42)
.




= σ2v implies that in the perfectly competitive case, there is no
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information left on the table. The result on β suggests that although each individual trader’s
trading intensity can be infinitesimally small, the aggregate trading intensity can be very
large as the number of traders increases. The results on λ and C suggest that as the number
of informed traders increases, market depth improves, but aggregate profits fall, tending to
zero only as the number of informed traders becomes large. The result on ξM , the fraction of
trading volume from informed traders, can be arbitrarily close to 1 as the number of traders
is large enough.
1.4 Numerical Illustrations and Comparative Statics
In what follows, I numerically illustrate how information structure and imperfect compe-
tition among informed traders affect market efficiency, market liquidity, trading volume,
price volatility, and expected profits of the informed traders. I also provide some empirical
implications.
Since M is the number of informed traders in the market, the model reduces to the
monopolist case if M is set to be 1. Most of the comparative static analysis is concerned
with the effect of changing M . One issue concerns the comparison between the duopolist case
M = 2 and monopolist case M = 1. I find that adding just one more informed trader to the
monopolist case will change the asymptotic properties of equilibrium in Chau and Vayanos’
model qualitatively. Another issue concerns within the oligopolistic situation. As we increase
M from M = 2 to large values, the competition among informed traders increases. I study
how changing the intensity of competition affects the properties of equilibrium.
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Market Efficiency
I set the parameters such that σv = σu = κ = 1 and r = 0.05. Σv measures the
market maker’s uncertainty about the liquidation value of the risk asset. It is therefore a
measure of the efficiency of price, with a smaller value corresponding to a more efficient price.
Σv = 0 corresponds to the scenario where information asymmetry vanishes and the market
is strong-form efficient. If increasing the number of imperfect competitors makes traders
willing to incorporate more private information into the price, the price should become more
informative and we therefore expect a smaller Σv as we increase M . As trading becomes more
frequent (h is smaller), the noncooperative setting results in a more aggressive competition,
making the already “impatient” informed traders even more “impatient”. To illustrate this
intuition, I show how Σv varies with h and M in Figure 1.1(A).
As shown in the figure, Σv monotonically decreases with h for the monopolist case and
for the oligopolist cases when M = 2, 3 and 10. The value of Σv declines more rapidly for
M ≥ 2 than for M = 1. If we fix h and vary only the number of informed traders, Σv is
found to be inversely related with the number of informed traders M . This confirms the
previous intuition that increasing competition makes the market more efficient.
Next I examine the asymptotic properties of Σv. According to Chau and Vayanos (2008),
Σv ∼
√
h as h→ 0 in the monopolist case M = 1. I prove in Proposition 1.2.2 that Σv ∼ h
in the oligopolist case M ≥ 2. In Figure 1.1(B), I show how the scaled value of Σv varies
with h for different M . I scale Σv by
√
h for M = 1 and h for M ≥ 1. From the figure,
Σh√
h
approaches to a constant for M = 1, confirming the asymptotic result obtained for the
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monopolistic trader. When M ≥ 2, Σv
h
converges to a positive constant confirming the







h converges to zero, private information is revealed much more quickly and price becomes
more efficient when there are multiple traders in the market.
Figure 1.2 illustrates how the degree of competition affects the asymptotic properties of
Σv. When M is large enough, limh→0
Σv
Σ2vh
can be very close to 1. Since Σv is always greater
than σ2vh, in the limit as M → ∞, we have the result of strong-form efficiency, consistent
with intuition based on perfect competition.
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Figure 1.1: (A) Σv as a function of h for M = 1, M = 2, M = 3 and M = 10. (B) Scaled Σv
as a function of h. Σv is scaled by
√
h for M = 1, and by h for M ≥ 2. Parameter values:





as a function of the number of informed traders M .
Trading Intensity β and Expected Quantity of Informed Trading
I have shown that, with increasing competition, informed traders reveal more information
through their trading. Intuitively, one should expect that the aggregate trading intensity
should be higher, and the fraction of trading volume contributed by informed traders should
be higher when M increases. I demonstrate numerically how each trader’s trading intensity
β and aggregate trading volume generated by the informed traders per period E(|Xn|) vary
with h, respectively, for the cases when M = 1, 2 ,3 and 10 in Figure 1.3.
As can be seen from the figure, when we compare monopoly M = 1 with duopoly M = 2,
the increased competition between the two traders induces each duopolist to choose a higher
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Figure 1.3: (A) The trading intensity parameter β as a function of h for M = 1, M = 2,
M = 3 and M = 10. (B) The aggregate expected trading volume per period E(Xn|) as a
function of h for M = 1, M = 2, M = 3 and M = 10. Parameter values: σv = σu = κ = 1
and r = 0.05.
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trading intensity β as shown in Figure 1.3(A) when h is small. But the result reverses sign
as we continue adding more informed traders when h is small. For M ≥ 2, the more the
informed traders, the less trading intensity from each individual trader. Each trader’s optimal
strategy is to exploit less the investment opportunity determined by the difference between
the true valuation of the asset and the price set by the market maker. Consequently, each
trader may actually trades less intensely as more traders become informed. In aggregate,
competition does make the traders behave more aggressively since the aggregate trading
intensity Mβ increases as competition becomes more intensive. In other words, when h is
small, for M ≥ 2, the value of β is decreasing in M while the value of Mβ is increasing in M .
Figure 1.4 illustrates how the asymptotic trading intensity limh→0 β and aggregate trading
intensity M limh→0 β vary with the number of informed traders. Although each individual
trader trades less intensely, the aggregate trading intensity monotonically increases with M .
As shown in Figure 1.3(B), the expected aggregate quantity of informed trading per pe-
riod E(|Xn|) monotonically increases with the number of traders M . Therefore, although
each individual trader tends to submit lower demand when the market becomes more compet-
itive, the aggregate trading volume which contains private information increases, conveying
more information to the market maker.
The asymptotic properties of β and E(|Xn|) can be inferred from Figure 1.3. In the
monopolist case, β is of order
√
h and E(|Xn|) = β
√
Σv is of order h
3
4 . In the imperfectly
competitive case, β converge to a positive constant and E(|Xn|) ∝ h
1
2 . Intuitively, as trading
becomes more frequent, there is less liquidity trading at each period to provide camouflage.
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Figure 1.4: limh→0 β and limh→0Mβ as functions of the number of informed traders.
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Figure 1.5: Fraction of trading volume of informed traders as a function of h for M = 1, 2, 3
and 10. Parameter values: σv = σu = κ = 1 and r = 0.05..
Therefore, the informed traders trade less intensely and scale back the trading volume at
each period. It can also be noted that in the monopolist case, the insider generates a
negligible fraction of total trading volume, whereas in the imperfectly competitive case, the
total aggregate volume submitted by the informed traders is comparable to the volume by
the liquidity traders. The results are illustrated in Figure 1.5. When M = 1, the ratio
quickly converges to zero when h is small. But the ratios converge to positive constants
when M > 1 and become 1 when M → +∞.
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Price variance
Since the aggregate trading volume is comparable to the trading volume of the liquidity
traders, following similar argument and Proposition 1.2.3, the informed traders’ contribution
to the total price variance is also non-negligible. Figure 1.6 illustrates how the total price
variance (blue lines) and its contribution by the informed traders (red lines) varies with the
time interval between rounds of trading and the number of informed traders.
In the monopolist case, although total price variance increases when h is small, the
contribution by the monopolistic trader converges to zero. The liquidity trader therefore
contributes almost all of the price volatility near continuous trading. In the imperfectly
competitive case, not only do informed traders contribute significantly to the total price
variance near continuous trading, but the ratio increases as the number of informed traders
increases. My numerical calculation make it reasonable to believe that the ratio converges
to 1 when M →∞.
Market Liquidity and Profitability
Stationarity requires that the price impact λ is a time independent constant. Figure 1.7
illustrates the effect of competition on λ. If we fix h and increase the number of informed
traders, λ declines accordingly. This is because in a steady state, more competition decreases
information asymmetry between informed traders and market maker, there is less adverse
selection. When the number of informed traders is fixed and trading frequency increases,
numerical calculations show that λ increases and converges to a positive constant. Two
opposite effects occur as trading becomes more frequent. On the one hand, there is less
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Figure 1.6: Total price variance (blue lines) and the contribution by the informed traders
(red lines) as a function of h for M = 1, 2, 3 and 10. Parameter values: σv = σu = κ = 1
and r = 0.05..
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Figure 1.7: The market liquidity parameter λ as a function of h for M = 1, 2, 3 and 10.
Parameter values: σv = σu = κ = 1 and r = 0.05.
liquidity trading over each period and the adverse selection problem is more severe. On the
other hand, as market becomes more efficient, there is less information asymmetry between
the informed traders and the market maker, and the adverse selection problem is less severe.
It can be shown from the figure that the first effect dominates with the adverse selection
parameter λ a decreasing function of h.
The fact that λ remains strictly positive in the continuous trading limit ensures that
informed traders make strictly positive expected profits. This is because informed traders
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benefit from the liquidity traders. Their profits are higher when price impact is higher and
when liquidity traders are able to move the price further away from the efficient value giving
informed traders opportunities to trade. To give a more rigorous explanation, remember
that profit margin per share is Σv which is of the order
√
h when h is small. The demand
submit in period n in absolute term by each informed trader is proportional to
√
h. Then
at each period, each informed trader earns a small expected profits in the order of h. The




which is finite when h → 0. Hence, our model predicts that each informed trader can still
earn positive expected profits in the continuous trading limit. But imperfect competition
does make each informed trader worse off. To demonstrate the effect of competition on
expected profits, we plot in Figure 1.8 the aggregate expected profits of informed traders
of informed traders as a function of h for different M . When M ≥ 2, the aggregate profits
monotonically decrease with M for fixed h and converge to positive constants as h→ 0.
Figure 1.9 illustrates how the asymptotic price impact limh→0 λ varies with the number of
informed traders. limh→0 λ monotonically decreases with M . When the number of traders is
large enough, the market can be infinitely deep with limh→0 λ very close to zero. Therefore,
the aggregate profits of informed traders also converges to zero as M →∞.
Empirical Implications
Hendershott and Riordan (2011b) find that high frequency traders’ marketable orders
have information advantage. Those traders trade in the direction of permanent price changes
and in the opposite direction of transitory pricing errors. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe
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Figure 1.8: Aggregate expected profits as a function of h for M = 1, 2, 3 and 10. Parameter
values: σv = σu = κ = 1 and r = 0.05.
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Figure 1.9: limh→0 λ as a function of the number of informed traders.
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that the high frequency traders who demand liquidity are “informed” traders. They may
not possess corporate inside information but are better and quicker than the average market
participants in gathering and processing information from massive market wide data to
generate private signals. The informed traders in my model can be treated as high frequency
traders when they are able to trade their information quickly (i.e, the frequency of trading
is very high). The unique results from my model in terms of efficiency, liquidity, trading
volume, price volatility, and expected profits can help us better understand the effects of
high frequency traders on financial markets than previous literature on strategic trading.
Hendershott et al. (2011), Hendershott and Riordan (2011a), Hendershott and Riordan
(2011b) and Brogaard (2010) provide evidences showing that the existence of high frequency
traders are beneficial to the market. Those traders provide more efficient quotes and the
growth of high frequency traders accompanies improvements in market liquidity, no matter
whether the traders are liquidity providers or liquidity demanders. In addition, high fre-
quency traders contribute significantly to trading volume. For example, Hendershott and
Riordan (2011b) estimate that high frequency traders initiating trades are responsible for
roughly 43% of trading volume in large stocks from a unique dataset from Nasdaq. High fre-
quency traders are found to implement highly correlated strategies but remain to be highly
profitable despite aggressive competition with one another.
At first glance, Chau and Vayanos (2008), Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) and Foster
and Viswanathan (1993) seem to be good candidates to be used to understand high frequency
trading. All three models can predict that high frequency trading make price more efficient,
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although traders in those models are “impatient” to reveal their superior information very
quickly for different reasons. However, all three models cannot explain trading volume. The
fraction of trading volume contributed by informed traders is essentially zero in continu-
ous trading limit. Chau and Vayanos (2008) shows that market is thinner when trading is
more frequent, and Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) and Foster and Viswanathan (1993)
show that market can be infinitely illiquid when trading starts. Their predictions cannot
perfectly explain the empirical fact that market liquidity increases with more participation
of high frequency traders. In addition, Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) and Foster and
Viswanathan (1993) predict that profits of informed traders quickly converge to zero when
there is imperfect competition. Zero expected profits are inconsistent with the profitability
of the imperfectly competitive high frequency traders. Therefore, both models cannot ex-
plain why high frequency traders can survive in the long run in an imperfect competitive
environment.
My model combines the two important features: (i) imperfect competition and (ii) con-
tinuous arrival of new private information. As the number of high frequency traders increases
due to ease of entry: (i) information is incorporated into prices more quickly and therefore
speeds up price discovery; (ii) high frequency traders participate in an even larger fraction of
total trading volume and price volatility, (iii) high frequency traders add to market liquidity
by competing aggressively with one another, and (iv) high frequency traders should make
profits which are bounded away from zero (like Cournot and not like Bertrand competition)
unless the number of high-frequency traders is very large.
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1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze how imperfect competition among informed traders affects market
efficiency, liquidity, trading volume and the profitability of informed traders. The combined
trading of multiple informed traders is more aggressive than the monopolistic trader, the
equilibrium price is even more revealing of the informed traders’ private information, and
market depth improves as the number of informed traders increases. In the continuous
trading limit, the variance of private information held by informed traders goes to zero at a
rate proportional to the time interval between rounds of trading. This is much faster than
the corresponding strong from efficiency result in the Chau and Vayanos model, where the
convergence rate is proportional to the square root of the time interval. In addition, in the
limit as the time interval between rounds of trading goes to zero, the aggregate profits of
the informed traders remain bounded away from zero and they contribute significantly to
the total trading volume and price volatility.
If high frequency traders are “informed” in a sense that they are able to generate prof-
itable private signals consistently by processing information from order flows and price move-
ments of securities across market, then this model provides a reasonable characterization of
those traders. My results suggest that the entry of more high frequency traders improves
market efficiency by incorporating information more quickly into price, improves market
liquidity by lowering price impact, and increases the fraction of trading volume from high
frequency traders. But those traders remain profitable despite exploiting the same informa-
tion set and implementing similar algorithms.
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Future research can extend the results of this paper in two directions. First, explain why
high frequency traders quickly reverse their inventories, we may add risk aversion. Second,
the assumption that traders are identically informed is too strong. The assumption does not
allow the more realistic scenario in which the informed traders learn from each other. Li
(2012) extends this paper by introducing a hierarchical information structure in which there
is one strictly better informed trader and one less informed trader. Kyle et al. (2012) further
relax the assumption in this paper even further to allow for a more general correlation among




Speculative Dynamics II: Asymmetric Traders
2.1 Introduction
In a financial market, there are a few large institutional traders who actively spend resources
generating information and competing aggressively with one another. These informed traders
are found to follow positively correlated strategies. Li (2011) provides a theoretical frame-
work that characterize the equilibrium behavior of those traders. If their information sets
and strategies are perfectly correlated, adding more informed traders can speed up price
discovery and improve market depth. They contribute significantly to trading volume and
price variance. In the seminal paper of Kyle (1985) and many extensions, the informed
trader’s contributions to the total trading volume and price variance are negligible to the
contributions by the liquidity trader in continuous trading. This is because that the informed
trader’s strategy is continuous (of order dt) and liquidity trading is a Brownian motion (of
order
√
dt). and manage to earn a profit strictly bounded away from zero even when the fre-
quency trading is very high near continuous trading. This is in sharp contrast to the strategic
trading models with one-shot private information. In the one shot private information setup
of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) and Foster and Viswanathan (1993), multiple informed
traders’ profits vanish due to imperfect competition in continuous trading.
In this paper, I relax the assumption in Li (2011) of identically informed traders. This
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assumption ignores the possibility that informed traders produce different information. If
their signals are imperfectly correlated, some traders have information that others don’t
possess. The inference problem becomes more complicated relative to the scenarios of one
monopolistic informed trader or multiple identically informed traders. On the one hand,
informed traders who do not know all the private information will infer any additional
information they do not have from past order flows and price movements, like uninformed
market makers. On the other hand, informed traders will treat their available information
differently: they trade cautiously on any exclusive information they may possess to exploit
their monopoly power, and they trade aggressively on information they share.
By allowing the signals observed by the informed traders to differ, especially when new
information arrives repeatedly, makes the problem very difficult to solve analytically. One
has to overcome the infinite regress problem arising in a dynamic model when traders try
to infer each other’s information. In this paper, we bypass the problem by focusing on a
hierarchical duopolistic setting. To be more specific, we consider an economy with a risky
asset which is going to be liquidated at a random date. The liquidation value is not fixed, but
rather evolves in a stochastic way and is only perfectly observed by an informed trader. The
other trader, however, observes a stream of noisy signals of the liquidation value. These noisy
signals are also observed by the first trader. Therefore, the second trader is less informed
and the first trader is strictly better informed. Both traders submit marketable orders to the
market maker along with liquidity traders at each trading period. The risk neutral market
maker cannot see each individual trader’s order but rather observes the batched order. She
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then sets the price equal to the expected value of the asset by solving an inference problem,
and takes the other side of the trade. The history of order imbalances provides information
not only to the market maker, but to the less informed trader as well. Like the market maker,
the less informed trader imperfectly infers the more informed trader’s additional information
from the history of order flows by subtracting her own contribution. In the meanwhile, she
has to compete with the more informed trader concerning any private information they both
observe.
There is another problem which is associated with the existence of linear equilibrium
in continuous trading when traders have perfectly correlated signals. Holden and Subrah-
manyam (1992) and Back et al. (2000) find that linear equilibrium does not exist when
informed traders are identically informed in the limit of continuous trading. This is because
risk neutral informed traders try to preempt each other causing the private information to
be revealed instantaneously, with trading intensity and price impact becoming infinite large
at the start of the trades (at t = 0+). Through the remaining of the trading sessions (t > 0),
there is no information asymmetry between the informed traders and therefore market is
infinitely deep. It is reasonable to believe that in a hierarchical private information setting
of Foster and Viswanathan (1994) where both asymmetric informed traders share a com-
mon noisy signal about the value of a risky asset to be liquidated at a predetermined date,
there is no linear equilibrium when trading is continuous1. In an economy where an risky
asset’s liquidation value is stochastic and private information arrives repeatedly, Li (2011)
1What should happen when trading is continuous is that both traders would trade on the common
private information so aggressively such that the common private information incorporated into price almost
instantaneously when trading starts and the more informed trader is able to monopolize the additional
exclusive information through the remaining trading session like the informed speculator in Kyle (1985).
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has found that stationary linear equilibrium does exist in the limit of continuous trading
with identically informed traders.
In this paper, we study the equilibrium in an economy with duopolistic traders endowed
with hierarchical information sets and a risk neutral market maker. Our model differs from
Foster and Viswanathan (1994) in several aspects. In Foster and Viswanathan’s model, all
the private information is known at time zero, the liquidation value of the asset is fixed
before trading starts, and there is a predetermined date when the asset is liquidated. In
this paper we have more realistic assumptions: both traders receive continuous flows of new
information, the fundamental value of the risky asset is stochastic, and the time for the risky
asset to be liquidated is random, following a geometric distribution. In their paper, Foster
and Viswanathan characterize the equilibria numerically and focus on time series properties
of equilibrium in an economy with only four trading periods. Because of the above argument
on the existence of equilibria in continuous trading, their paper does not address the economic
properties of equilibrium when trading periods are shortened to continuous limit. In this
paper, by making different assumptions and focusing on stationary equilibrium, we are able
to derive the equilibria in a closed form, able to derive economic propertis like to market
efficiency, market liquidity, and profitability.
By analyzing the properties of the equilibrium, the overall private information held by
both traders can be decomposed into two orthogonal components: a “common” component
of the private information known to both traders and “monopolistic” component known
only to the more informed trader. Consistent with the results found in Chau and Vayanos
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(2008) and Li (2011), the variances of both pieces of information converge to zero in the
continuous trading limit. However, the rates of how the two components of information are
incorporated into prices are quite different. When h is small (denote h to be the time interval
between trades), the variance of common component of private information not incorporated
into prices is proportional to h, while the variance of the monopolistic component of private
information not incorporated into prices is proportional to the square root of h. This suggests
that the common private information is incorporated more efficiently than the additional
monopolistic information.
The degree of competition is measured by the precision of the information stream that
is shared by both traders. Increasing the precision ρ can have two effects on market depth.
On the one hand, there will be more common private information and less monopolistic
information at each period and therefore more information will be incorporated into prices
conditional on the total private information. Since the market orders carry more informa-
tion, market maker should set a higher price impact. On the other hand, over time price
should become more efficient, there should be less information asymmetry among the mar-
ket participants, and the market should be more liquid. It can be shown in the stationary
state, the second effect dominates, thus the more precise the shared private information, the
more liquid the market becomes. Following the same logic, the inference parameter which
measures the sensitivity of belief to order flow for the less informed trader monotonically
also decreases with ρ.
In almost all dynamics models with price impact, the contribution to the trading volume
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or price variance from informed trading is negligible. This is because in the continuous
time limit as the interval between trades h goes to zero, the value of informed trading is
of order h, whereas the value of liquidity or noise trading strategy is a Brownian motion
of order
√
h. Li (2011) shows that with imperfect competition and continuous arrival of
new private information, the informed traders’ strategy can be a Brownian motion in the
limit as h→ 0. Therefore, informed traders can contribute significantly to the total trading
volume and add a volatility component to the price formation process. In this model, since
imperfectly competitive informed traders share a stream of signals, their strategies on the
common private information also become Brownian motions as h → 0 and therefore the
contributions to the total trading volume and price variance by the two traders should be
non-negligible in the limit.
A somewhat surprising result is that, contrary to conventional wisdom, when the fre-
quency of trading is sufficiently high, the less informed trader may contribute a more sig-
nificant fraction to total trading volume and price variance than the more informed trader.
A trader may rationally trade more because her information is “worse”. The intuition for
why this happens is that the less informed trader trades more aggressively on the common
private information, and the difference in trading on the common information may dominate
the trading volume in the additional private information by the more informed trader. The
more informed trader’s strategy on her additional private information is of order h
3
4 which
is negligible compared to
√
h when h is small enough.
Although not formally stated in Foster and Viswanathan (1994), by following the same
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spirit of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) and Foster and Viswanathan (1993), when the
time interval between trades goes to zero, the informed traders compete so aggressively
based on shared information that this information is incorporated into prices almost instan-
taneously and the profits of the less-informed trader go to zero. This paper generates an
opposite result in terms of the profitability of the less informed trader. When the interval
between rounds of trading is small, both the profits of the more informed and less informed
traders remain bounded away from zero, with the profits of the more informed trader much
greater than the profits of the less informed when the signals are not highly correlated.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section II, I describe the model. The equilibrium
and its asymptotic properties are presented in Section III. Section IV shows some comparative




Trading takes place from t = 0 to t = +∞ at the discrete points tn (tn = nh) through
time where h is the time interval between the auctions. There are a riskless bond with
zero interest rate and a non-dividend paying risky asset with a stochastic liquidation value
vn. At the end of each period, there is a probability 1 − exp (−rh) that the risky asset is
liquidated. I further assume the riskless bond is in perfect elastic supply. The liquidation
value vn follows a mean-reverting process or random walk:
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vn − vn−1 = κ(v̄ − vn−1)h+ εv,n. (2.1)
In the above specification, κ determines the adjustment speed of the liquidation value vn to
its long run fixed target v̄; κ is assumed to be greater than or equal to zero implying that
the prices are stationary2; and the innovation εv,n is independently and normally distributed
with mean zero and variance σ2vh.
Assumption 2: Market Participants and Information Structure
The risk neutral market participants consist of a competitive market maker, two informed
strategic traders, and a number of liquidity traders. The two strategic traders, however, are
asymmetrically informed with a hierarchical information structure such that one trader is less
informed and the other is better informed. Therefore, their information sets are hierarchical.
At each period, the less informed trader observes a noisy signal sn about εv,n (the innovation
term in equation (2.1)) in the form
sn = ρεv,n +
√
1− ρ2en (2.2)
where 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 and en ∼ N(0, σ2vh) is normally distributed and uncorrelated with other
shocks in the economy. The better informed trader observes vn perfectly but also observes
the noisy signal sn each trading period. The variable ρ measures the level of precision
of the noisy signal received by both traders. When ρ = 0, the less informed trader is
completely uninformed. When ρ = 1, both traders are identically and perfectly informed.
2If κ = 0, then vn follows a random walk.
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I in = {pτ , vτ , sτ |τ ≤ n} is the more informed trader’s information set at t = nh, I ln =
{pτ , sτ |τ ≤ n} is the less informed trader’s information set, and Imn = {pτ |τ ≤ n} is the




n and the information sets are
nested.
Assumption 3: Timing of Events
At the beginning of the nth period, the informed traders and the liquidity traders submit
their demands before new information arrives. Let zn denote the less informed trader’s
market order and xn denote the more informed trader’s market order. After the market
orders are submitted, both informed traders observe sn but only the more informed perfectly
observes vn. The market maker observes the total order flow yn = xn + zn + un, then sets
the price pn equal to the expected value of the asset based on the history of orders flows,
and then clears the market.
Pricing
Since the market maker is assumed to be competitive and risk neutral, at period n she
sets the price pn equal to the expected value of the asset after she receives the total batched




(1− exp (−rh)) exp (−r(n′ − n)h)vn′ |Imn ], (2.3)
where (1− exp (−rh)) exp (−r(n′ − n)h) is the probability that the asset is liquidated at the
end of the n′th period.
Lemma 2.2.1: The price pn is the following linear function of the market maker’s
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expectation of the current liquidation value of the risky asset E(vn|Imn ):
pn =
(1− exp (−rh))





Proof : See Appendix B.
Although the market maker observes the total order flow, she cannot distinguish the
contributions made by the more informed trader, less informed trader and the liquidity
trader. The less informed trader, however, by observing the price set by the market maker,
can infer the sum of the orders by the more informed trader and liquidity trader, xn + un,
therefore enabling her to maker a sharper inference about vn than the market maker. Similar
to the pricing function of Lemma 2.2.1, the less informed trader’s valuation of the risky asset





(1− exp(−rh)) exp(−r(n′ − n)h)vn′|I ln] (2.5)
=
(1− exp (−rh))






Since informed traders are risk neutral, then at the nth period, the better informed trader






(1− exp(−rh)) exp(−r(n′ − n)h)(
n′∑
τ=n
xτ (vn′ − pτ ))|I in−1]. (2.6)
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Proof : See Appendix B.















2.2.2 Equilibrium Strategies and Value Functions
Suppose that conditional on information up to period n− 1, the market maker believes that
vn−1 is normally distributed with mean v̂n−1 and variance Σv,n−1, while the less informed
trader believes the mean to be v∗n−1 and variance to be Λv,n−1. Then, Σv,n−1 measures the
total variance of private information not incorporated into prices at the (n − 1)th period.
The value of Λv,n−1 measures the variance of private information withheld exclusively by
the better informed trader, and therefore Ωv,n−1 = Σv,n−1 − Λv,n−1 measures the variance of
private information withheld by both informed traders.
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I hypothesize that the more informed insider submits demand
xn = β(vn−1 − v∗n−1) + γ(v∗n−1 − v̂n−1) (2.9)
to maximize the present value of her expected profits scaled by (1−exp (−rh))
(1−exp (−rh)(1−κh)) which is
quadratic with respect to vn−1 − v∗n−1 and v∗n−1 − v̂n−1:
V i(vn−1−v∗n−1, v∗n−1−v̂n−1) = A(vn−1−v∗n−1)2+B(v∗n−1−v̂n−1)2+C(vn−1−v∗n−1)(v∗n−1−v̂n−1)+E.
(2.10)
The strategy and value function not only depend on vn−1 but also depend on v
∗
n−1 since
the more informed trader understands that her action will be closely followed by the less
informed trader as well as the market maker. The less informed insider submits demand
zn = θ(v
∗
n−1 − v̂n−1) (2.11)
to maximize the present value of her expected profits scaled by (1−exp (−rh))
(1−exp (−rh)(1−κh)) , which is
quadratic with respect to v∗n−1 − v̂n−1:
V l(v∗n−1 − v̂n−1) = F (v∗n−1 − v̂n−1)2 +G. (2.12)
Note that the order submission strategy of the more informed trader (Equation 2.9) can
be decomposed into two parts. The first term is proportional to the difference between the
perfect signal she receives and the information she shares with the other trader with intensity
55
β. The second term is proportional to the difference between the information she shares and
the estimation of vn−1 by the market maker with intensity γ. The less informed trader,
bases her trade on the difference between the information she shares and market maker’s
estimation on vn−1 with intensity θ.
2.3 Inference Problems, Optimizations and The Equilibrium
2.3.1 The Market Maker’s Inference Problem
The market maker uses the total order flow yn, together with her prior belief on vn−1 to form
the posterior belief about vn−1:
vn−1 = E(vn−1|Imn−1) +
λ
1− κh




(xn + zn + un) + ηn.
She believes that vn−1 is normally distributed with mean E(vn−1|Imn ) in the form




and variance var(ηn). Then according to the stochastic process of vn (equation (2.1)), she
believes that vn ∼ N(v̂n, var((1 − κh)ηn + εv,n)) is normally distributed with conditional
mean
E(vn|Imn ) = v̂n = (1− κh)v̂n−1 + λyn + κhv̄ (2.15)
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and conditional variance
var(vn|Imn ) = (1− κh)2var(ηn) + σ2vh. (2.16)
In the next theorem, we derive the explicit form of the inference parameter λ and set up
nonlinear equation which can be solved for Σv.
Lemma 2.3.1: Given the trading strategies of the informed traders defined in equations
(2.9) and (2.11), the market maker’s inference parameter λ is given by
λ =
(1− κh)(βΛv + (γ + θ)Ωv)
β2Λv + (γ + θ)2Ωv + σ2uh
. (2.17)
The uncertainty of the market maker’s belief on the risky asset’s liquidation value Σv satisfies
the following nonlinear equation:
Σv = (1− κh)2(Σv −
(βΛv + (γ + θ)Ωv)
2
β2Λv + (γ + θ)2Ωv + σ2uh
) + σ2vh. (2.18)
Proof : See Appendix B.
2.3.2 The Less Informed Trader’s Inference Problem
In this subsection, we solve the inference problem of the less informed trader. At period n,
the less informed insider can infer the realization of xn + un since the trader needs only to
subtract her contribution zn from the total order flow yn. Because xn + un contains private
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information which is exclusive to the more informed trader about vn−1, the less informed










(xn + un − γ(v∗n−1 − v̂n−1)) + εn
with the conditional mean
E(vn−1|I ln) = v∗n−1 +
φ
1− κh
(xn + un − γ(v∗n−1 − v̂n−1)) (2.20)
and conditional variance var(εn).
When forming the posterior belief about vn, the trader needs to take into account of the
signal sn. Hence, the conditional mean and conditional variance of vn are given by
v∗n = E(vn|I ln) = (1− κh)v∗n−1 + κhv̄ + φ(xn + un − γ(v∗n−1 − v̂n−1)) + ρsn. (2.21)
and
var(vn|I ln) = (1− κh)2var(εn) + (1− ρ2)σ2vh (2.22)
respectively.
In the following theorem, we derive the explicit form of the less informed trader’s inference
parameter φ and setup the nonlinear equation for Λv.
Lemma 2.3.2: Given the more informed trader’s strategy defined in equation (2.9)
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and the price process determined by the market maker in equation (2.15), the inference







The trader’s uncertainty about the liquidation value of the risky asset Λv satisfies the fol-
lowing nonlinear equation:






+ (1− ρ2)σ2vh. (2.24)
Proof : see Appendix B.
2.3.3 The More Informed Trader’s Optimization Problem
At period n, the more informed trader submits demand xn to maximize the the expected







We have conjectured that the trader’s value function V1(vn−1, v
∗
n−1, v̂n−1) in period n,
evaluated at after submitting the market order xn, is a quadratic function of vn−1−v∗n−1 and
v∗n−1 − v̂n−1, as shown in equation (2.10). In equilibrium, V i(vn−1, v∗n−1, v̂n−1) must satisfy
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the following Bellman equation
V i(vn−1, v
∗
n−1, v̂n−1) = maxxnE[(vn − v̂n)xn + e−rhV i(vn, v∗n, v̂n)|I in−1]. (2.26)
Lemma 2.3.3: Given the price process determined by the market maker and the strategy
of the less informed trader, the trading strategy of the more informed trader is characterized
by:
β = (2τ)−1[1− κh− 2e−rhAφ(1− κh) + e−rhC(φ− λ)(1− κh)] (2.27)
and
γ = (2τ)−1[1− κh− λθ − 2e−rhAφγ (2.28)
+ 2e−rhB(φ− λ)(1− κh− φγ − λθ)
+ e−rhC(φ− λ)φγ − e−rhCφ(1− κh− φxγ − λθ)]
where
τ = λ− e−rh(Aφ2 +B(φ− λ)2 − Cφ(φ− λ)) (2.29)
The Bellman equation (2.26) has the solution of quadratic form A(vn−1− v∗n−1)2 +B(v∗n−1−
v̂n−1)
2 +C(vn−1−v∗n−1)(v∗n−1− v̂n−1)+E, with A, B, C and E characterized by the following
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set of nonlinear equations:
A = β(1− κh− λβ) + e−rhA(1− κh− φβ)2 + (φ− λ)β]2 (2.30)
+ e−rhC(1− κh− φβ)(φ− λ)β,
B = γ(1− κh− λ(γ + θ)) + e−rhB[1− κh− λγ − λθ]2, (2.31)
C = β(1− κh− λ(γ + θ)) + γ(1− κh− λβ) (2.32)
+ 2e−rhB(φ− λ)β[1− κh− λγ − λθ]
+ e−rhC(1− κh− φβ)[1− κh− λγ − λθ],
and
E = e−rh[A(φ2σ2uh+ (1− ρ2)σ2vh) (2.33)
+ B((φ− λ)2σ2uh+ ρ2σ2vh)
− C(φ(φ− λ)σ2uh) + E].
Proof : See Appendix B.
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2.3.4 The Less Informed Trader’s Optimization Problem
Having solved the dynamic programming of the more informed trader, we then focus on the
less informed trader’s optimization problem. Conditional on her most recent information set,








The value function of the less informed trader is assumed to be quadratic in v∗n−1 − v̂n−1
and solves the following Bellman equation in equilibrium:
V l(v∗n−1, v̂n−1) = maxznE[zn(vn − v̂n) + e−rhV l(v∗n − v̂n)|I ln−1]. (2.35)
The following theorem characterizes the trading strategy of the less informed trader and the
solution for the Bellman equation.
Lemma 2.3.4: Given the trading strategy of the more informed trader and the pricing
rule determined by the market maker, the optimal strategy of the less informed trader is
characterized by
θ =
(1− 2e−rhλF )(1− κh− λγ)
2λ(1− e−rhλF )
. (2.36)
The Bellman equation (2.35) has the solution in a quadratic form F (v∗n−1− v̂g−1)2 +G, with
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F and G characterized by the following set of nonlinear equations:
F = θ(1− κh− λγ − λθ) + e−rhF (1− κh− λγ − λθ)2 (2.37)
and
G = e−rhF [(φ− λ)2β2Λv + (φ− λ)2σ2uh (2.38)
+ ρ2σ2vh] + e
−rhG.
Proof : See Appendix B.
2.3.5 Equilibrium and Trading in the Continuous Time Limit
Having solved the inference problems for the market maker and the less informed trader and
the optimization problems for both informed traders, in the next theorem we establish the
necessary and sufficient conditions for the stationary equilibrium.
Proposition 1: The linear stationary equilibrium of the model with hierarchical infor-
mation structure is characterized by 13 parameters (λ, φ, Σv, Λv, β, γ, θ, A, B, C, E, F and
G) which are solutions to the system of equations (2.17 - 2.18), (2.23 - 2.24), (2.27 - 2.34)
and (2.36 - 2.39).
We are mostly concerned with the asymptotic properties of the equilibria in the limit of
continuous trading, i.e., h→ 0. When there is only one monopolistic informed insider, Chau
and Vayanos prove that the variance of information not incorporated into prices at each
63
trading period is proportional to
√
h and the trading intensity is of order
√
h. By contrast,
in an economy with multiple identical informed traders, the variance of private information
left at each period is proportional to h and the trading intensity converges to a strictly
positive constant. In this paper, since the total private information can be decomposed
into two orthogonal components, we should expect that the variance of common private
information not incorporated into prices Ωv at each period is proportional to h and the
variance of additional private information Λv left at each period converges to zero at rate of
order of
√
h. The intensity at which the more informed trader trades, based on her additional
private information, β, should converge to zero at the order
√
h. The intensities at which
both traders trade, based on their common information, γ and θ, should converge to positive
constants. The next theorem establishes the asymptotic behavior of the equilibrium.



















γ = γ0 (2.42)
lim
h→0
θ = θ0 (2.43)
lim
h→0












A = A0 limh→0B = B0 lim
h→0
C = C0 (2.46)
lim
h→0
E = E0 limh→0 F = F0 lim
h→0
G = G0,
where λ0, φ0, a, b, γ0, θ0, L, O, A0, B0, C0, E0, F0 and G0 satisfy the following set of
nonlinear equations:
λ0 =
(γ0 + θ0)O + bL







λ0 − φ0 + A0φ20 −B0(φ0 − λ0)2
, (2.49)
γ0 =








F = θ0(1− λ(γ0 + θ0)) + F0(1− λ(γ0 + θ0))2, (2.52)
B0 = γ0(1− λ(γ0 + θ0)) +B0(1− λ(γ + θ))2, (2.53)
1− 2A0φ0 − C0(φ0 − λ0) = 0, (2.54)
−λb2 − (r + 2κ)A0 + 2A0ab+ Aφ2b2 − φb2C0(φ− λ) = 0, (2.55)
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E =




F (φ− λ)2σ2u + ρ2σ2v
r
(2.57)
2.4 Properties of Equilibriums and Comparative Statics
In what follows, we illustrate how information structure, the strategic interaction between
the two informed traders, and increasing trading frequency affect market efficiency, liquidity,
trading strategies, trading volume, and expected profits of the informed traders.
The variable ρ measures the precision of the noisy signal. Intuitively, it also measures
the degree of information asymmetry and hence the degree of imperfect competition between
the two informed traders. The higher the value of ρ, the more precise the stream of noisy
signals observed by both traders, the more information shared by both traders and less
private information exclusively held by the more informed trader. To illustrate the effect
of imperfect competition and the strategic interaction between the two traders, I compare
the results of when 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 with two benchmark cases. When ρ = 1, both traders are
equally informed and there is no information asymmetry between them; when ρ = 0, the less
informed trader is completely uninformed and the more informed trader is a monopolist on
the perfect signal she receives.
Market Efficiency
Since the information sets are hierarchical, I can decompose the overall private infor-
mation held by the informed traders vn − v̂n into two orthogonal components: the private
information known to both traders v∗n − v̂n and the information exclusive to the more in-
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formed trader vn − v∗n. It is natural to expect that both traders act like duopolists on the
common component of the information, and the more informed trader is able to monopolize
the information exclusive to herself.
Following the intuitions, we should expect that Ωv, which measures the market maker’s
uncertainty about the first component, is of order h when h is small and Λv, which measures
the variance about the second component, is of order
√
h3. Therefore, the shared private
information should be incorporated into prices in a much higher rate than the monopolistic
private information. Because Σv = Ωv+Λv and the
√
h dominates h for small h, the variance





as h → 0, the market approaches to strong-form efficiency in the continuous trading limit
with no information asymmetry among the informed traders and market maker.
To illustrate the properties of market participants beliefs about the liquidation value vn,
we plot the variance Σv, Λv and Ωv against h respectively, for the cases when ρ = 0.7, ρ = 1
and ρ = 0 in Figure 2.1. When ρ = 0.7, Σv is always greater than Λv implying that the
less informed trader is making a sharper inference about the liquidation value of the asset
than the market maker. The difference between Σv and Λv is actually Ωv which measures
the variance of v∗n − v̂n. As h becomes smaller, Σv and Λv also decrease converging to zero
and so does their difference, Ωv.
We then compare the results when ρ = 0.7 to the benchmark cases when ρ = 1 and
ρ = 0. The stream of “noisy” signal received by the less informed trader becomes perfect
3In the monopolist case, Chau and Vayanos (2008) prove that the private information not incorporated
into price is of order
√
h when h is small. In the oligopolist case in Li (2011), the author proves that the
convergence rate is proportional to h.
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Figure 2.1: Σv, Λv and Ωv as functions of h for the cases when ρ = 0, 0.7 and 1. Parameter
values: σv = σu = κ = 1 and r = 0.05.
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and she is as informed as the other trader if ρ = 1. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, Λv is always
zero and Ωv = Σv. If ρ = 0, the fact that the less informed trader is completely uninformed
and she can make an inference no better than the market maker leads to Σv = Ωv.
Trading Intensity Parameters: β, γ and θ
We have demonstrated that the more informed trader monopolizes any additional private
information. Remember that β is the intensity with which the more informed trader trades
on this information, β should be of order
√
h when h is small. γ and θ are the intensities with
which the traders trade on the common private information. From the asymptotic properties
derived in Proposition 2, we expect γ and θ converge to positive constants when h is closed
to zero.
We first examine how the trading intensity parameters vary with the time interval between
trades and the precision of the stream of noisy signals. In Figure 2.2, we plot β, γ and θ
against h for the cases when ρ = 0.3, ρ = 0.9 and ρ = 1. As h becomes smaller, so do
β, γ and θ because the variance of noise trading is getting smaller at each trading period.
The value of β converges to zero except at ρ = 1 when the “more” informed trader has no
additional private information. The values of γ and θ converge to strictly positive values. In
addition, θ is always greater than γ except at ρ = 1 implying that the less informed trader
always acts more aggressively on their common private information than the more informed
trader.




limh→0 γ and θ0 = limh→0 θ. Figure 2.3 illustrates how b, γ0 and θ0 vary with ρ. The value of
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Figure 2.2: The trading intensity parameters (β, γ and θ) as functions of h for cases when
ρ = 0.3, 0.9 and 1. Parameter values: σv = σu = κ = 1 and r = 0.05.
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b first increases with ρ slowly when ρ is small, but increases sharply with ρ when it is close
to 1. Since limh→0 β is found to be strictly positive at ρ = 1, we should expect b→ +∞ as
ρ → 1. The result is consistent with the counterpart found in Chau and Vayanos (2008) in
which b is infinity if there is no adverse selection between the monopolistic insider and the
market maker.
Although the two traders act like competing duopolists, the asymptotic properties of
trading intensities are quite different from the counterparts found in Li (2011). Li finds that
the trading intensity can be sufficient large when the information asymmetry between the
identically informed traders and the market maker is small enough in the limit of continuous
trading, and that the trading intensity is inversely related to information asymmetry. One
can tell from Figure 2.3(B) and (C) that γ0 and θ0 remain bounded at ρ = 0. γ0 is found
to be a non-monotonic function of ρ. γ0 first monotonically decreases with ρ and later
monotonically increases with ρ when ρ is close to 1. θ0 is a monotonically increasing function
for all values of ρ.
Inference Parameters: φ and λ
Li (2011) finds that more competition leads to a smaller price impact parameter λ and
hence a more liquid market. The degree of competition is measured by the number of the
traders in the market. In this paper, the number of traders is fixed to be two and the degree
of competition is measured by the precision of the noisy signal both traders receive. We
expect that the same conclusion still holds: as ρ increases, the market should become more
liquid in the stationary state where the market maker is facing a less severe adverse selection.
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Figure 2.3: The asymptotic properties of trading intensity parameters (b, γ0 and θ0) as
functions of h for cases when ρ = 0.3, 0.9 and 1. Parameter values: σv = σu = κ = 1 and
r = 0.05.
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Figure 2.4(A) and (B) confirm the conjecture. For a fixed h, the price impact or the inference
parameter for the market maker λ (inverse measure of market depth) monotonically decreases
with ρ. The inference parameter for the less informed trader φ is also found to be negatively
related to ρ since the trader becomes more informative about the value of the asset as the
stream of signals she observes becomes more precise. When ρ = 1, φ strictly equals to zero
since the “less” informed trader is perfectly informed and learns nothing from the history of
order flows.
In Figure 2.4(C), we plot λ0 = limh→0 λ and φ0 = limh→0 φ against ρ. We finds that λ0
is always greater than φ0 except at ρ = 0. This is because the less informed trader is more
informed than the market maker and learns less from the order flow.
Expected Quantity of Informed Trading
Intuition might suggest (incorrectly) that the better informed trader trade more than the
less informed trader on average because she has more private information. However, since the
less informed trader trades more intensely on the shared private information, the difference
between how they trade the common information may dominate the trading volume by the
more informed trader on her exclusive private information. We confirm the intuition in
Figure 2.5. In Figure 2.5(A), we fix ρ = 0.9 and κ = 1. When h is relatively large, the
contribution to the total trading volume by the more informed trader is greater than that
by the less informed trader. The relation switches sign when h becomes smaller or the
frequency of trading is higher. In Figure 2.5(B), we let ρ = 0.6 and κ = 1; in (C), we let
ρ = 0.6 and κ = 0. We observe similar phenomena as in (A). But the frequency at which
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Figure 2.4: (A) and (B) The inference parameters φ, λ as functions of h for ρ = 0, 0.3, 0.9
and 1. Parameter values: σv = σu = κ = 1 and r = 0.05. (C) λ0 and φ0 as functions of ρ.
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the less informed trader starts to dominate the better informed trader in terms of trading
volume becomes higher if we decrease ρ or κ.
Expected Profits
Although Foster and Viswanathan (1994) do not address the issue of each informed
trader’s expected profits in the limit of continuous trading, it is reasonable to believe that
as the time interval between trades converges to zero, the informed traders compete so
aggressively on shared private information that the information is reflected into prices in-
stantaneously and the profits of the less informed trader go to zero. The better informed
trader however, can earn strictly positive profits by trading the remaining monopolized in-
formation slowly. Li (2011) has shown that identically informed traders can earn strictly
positive profits when trading is continuous if the information arrives repeatedly. It is reason-
able to believe that in this model, despite both informed traders compete very aggressively
on their shared stream of noisy signals, in the limit, the less informed trader can still earn a
non-zero expected profits.
Figure 2.6 illustrates how each informed trader’s expected profits vary with the time
interval between trading and the precision of the flow of the noisy signals observed by both
traders. We find that the less informed trader’s expected profits increase when ρ becomes
higher. Intuitively, the better the information received by the less informed trader, the more
market power and hence the better investment opportunity she has. A more interesting
result is that as h converges to zero, both the profits of the more and less informed traders
remain strictly positive, with the profits of the more informed trader greater than the profits
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Figure 2.5: Contributions to the total trading volume. Parameter values: σv = σu = 1 and
r = 0.05.
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of the less informed trader. When ρ = 1, we reach to the benchmark case where both traders
are equally informed. We should expect them to earn the same expected profits and it is
confirmed in the Figure.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine how the correlation among flows of information received by in-
formed traders affects the market efficiency, market liquidity, trading volume and their ex-
pected profits, especially in the limit of continuous trading. We consider a very special case
in which duopolistic informed traders’ information sets are nested.
We find the total private information can be decomposed into two components with
each component incorporated into prices in a qualitatively different manner in the limit.
The shared private information is incorporated into prices much more quickly than the
information held exclusively by the more informed trader. One can find that the less informed
trader acts more aggressively than the better informed trader. When the frequency of trading
becomes high enough, the less informed trader who has worse information contributes more
trading volume contrary to conventional wisdom. The profits for the less informed trader
may fall as trading becomes more frequent, but converge to a positive constant in the limit
as the time interval between trades goes to zero.
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Figure 2.6: (A) and (B) The expected profits for each informed trader as functions of h for
cases when ρ = 0.4, 0.8 and 1. (C) Expected profits for each trader as functions of ρ in the
limit of continuous trading. Parameter values: σv = σu = κ = 1 and r = 0.05.
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Chapter 3
Real Options and Product Differentiation
3.1 Introduction
Ever since the pioneering work of McDonald and Siegel (1986), the real options literature
often either assumes the firm to be a monopolist (Pindyck (1988), He and Pindyck (1992))
or assumes the firm to be perfectly competitive (Dixit (1989) ). Very little literature has
modeled the imperfect competition among firms in exercising real options (option games).
Smets (1993) provides the first approach to model real options game in a duopoly industry.
In his model, the capital stock choice is discrete and there is a upper bound in the total
industry capital stock. He also randomly picks a firm to be the leader by investing first (the
other firm which invests later is called the follower) when time comes to make investment.
The subsequent work that follow Smets’s approach include Grenadier (1996) and Williams
(1993) .
In the situation where the capital stock choice is continuous, implying that each firm
can make arbitrarily small investment, the firms face a pre-emption problem. Each firm has
incentive to preempt its competitors to prematurely invest to extract more rents. Grenadier
(2002) claims to solve the equilibrium in an oligopoly industry by using a “myopic firm”
approach. When a “myopic” firm is evaluating the optimal time to invest, it assumes that
all other firms’ capital stock is fixed forever. The equilibrium derived in his approach has
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lower growth options value relative to the monopolist case but is still positive. Such an
equilibrium, however is not subgame perfect. It is an “open loop” equilibrium instead of a
“closed loop” equilibrium, as pointed out by Back and Paulsen (2009). In an “open loop”
equilibrium, each player in the game cannot observe the other players’ actions. While in a
“closed loop” equilibrium, all past play is common knowledge. In Grenadier (2002)’s setup,
each firm can infer its opponent’s capital stock from the price of the product. It can be
shown that, by knowing its opponent’s capital stock, each firm has incentive to preempt its
opponent by investing earlier than the conjectured optimal time in Grenadier’s equilibrium.
As long as the value of the real option is positive, each firm will have incentive to invest till
the real option value drops to zero. This means that the preemption never disappears as long
as the growth options is positive. Back and Paulsen further conjecture that the equilibrium
with pre-emption should be competitive in an oligopoly industry with elastic demand such
that the real option value remains zero all the time .
In Grenadier (2002) and Back and Paulsen (2009), the products are homogenous (per-
fect substitute). This paper examines whether the incentive to preempt could diminish if
we assume heterogenous products instead. By making such an assumption, each firm has
some limited monopoly power over its product. I examine whether such monopoly power,
although limited, could decrease the competition of exercising options to such an extent that
preemption is no longer profitable and the value of growth options is still positive. However,
we find that under the assumption of non-flexibility of capital stock, preemption is always
profitable even though the products are imperfect substitute.
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The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section II, we describe the model. We solve the
equilibria using the “myopic” approach for the CES demand case in Section III and for the
linear demand case in Section IV. We find the equilibrium is not subgame perfect in either
case. Section V concludes.
3.2 Model Setup
3.2.1 Demand Function and Capacity Process
I make the following assumptions:
(1) There exits an industry composed of n firms each producing a single non-storable
differentiated product. In section III, I use the CES (constant elasticity of substitution)
demand function. The inverse demand function is given by





where dY = µY dt+ σY dz is an exogenous shock process to demand. ρ measures the degree
of differentiation, ranging from 0 for independent goods to 1 for perfect substitutes. The
demand function is derived from a n-good industry with representative consumer with utility





θ (Xavier Vives 2000). Another specification can be found






In section 3.4 , I use the linear inverse demand function: Pi = Yt − βqi − γ
∑
j 6=i qj.
(2) At time t, each firm produces qi(t) ≤ Ki(t) units of output where Ki is the capital
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stock of firm i. For simplicity, zero variable cost of production is assumed. The operating
profit flow is denoted πi(Y (t), Ki(t), K−i(t)) = Piqi.
(3) At any point in time, each firm can invest in additional capacity to increase its
output. Each unit of capacity costs I. I assume that Ki is a nondecreasing process implying
completely irreversibility of capital stock. I also assume that there exists an investment
strategy which is characterized by the trigger function Y (Ki, K−i). Whenever Y (t) rises to
the trigger function, firm i increases its capacity level.
(4) The firm i is solving the following problem:











3.2.2 Risk Neutral Measure
Following Carlson et al. (2004), let Bt denote the price of the riskless asset with dynamics
dBt = rBtdt, where r is the risk-free interest rate, and let St be the risky asst with dynamics
dSt = ηStdt+ σStdzt. (3.3)




is a standard Brownian motion. Under this new measure, the demand dynamics becomes
dYt = (r − δ)Ytdt+ σYtdẑt (3.4)
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where δ = η − µ > 0.
3.3 Symmetric Open Loop Equilibrium for CES Demand Function
3.3.1 The Open Loop Equilibrium
I consider the case when there are two firms in the industry.
Proposition 3.1











and K = Ki = Kj to be each firm’s capacity.
2. The firm i’s value is given by
Vi(Y,K) = I(1−
2λ1θ
(λ1 − 1)(θ + 1)
)ν−λ1(
1











λ1(ρθ − 1) + 1
)Kλ1(ρθ−1)+1Y λ1 = J(K)Y + E(K)Y λ1 (3.7)
and the value of growth option is
Gi(Y,K) = −I
2λ1θ
(λ1 − 1)(θ + 1)
ν−λ1(
1
λ1(ρθ − 1) + 1
)Kλ1(ρθ−1)+1Y λ1 = C(K)Y λ1 . (3.8)
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Proof:
From standard arguments in the literature on investment with uncertainty, V i(Y,Ki, K−i)
and Y (Ki, K−i) are solutions to the following differential equation:
1
2
σ2Y 2V iY Y + (r − δ)Y V iY − rV i + πi(Y,Ki, K−i) = 0, (3.9)
with the following boundary conditions
∂V i
∂Ki
(Y (Ki, K−i), Ki, K−i) = I, (3.10)
∂2V i
∂Ki∂Y




(Y (Ki, K−i), Ki, K−i) = 0. (3.12)
Grenadier provides a simple approach to solve the equilibrium strategies without involving
fixed point problem. He considers a myopic firm i that ignores all potential competitive
exercise. The value of the myopic firm is denoted as M i(Y,Ki, K−i). Then, I will denote the




. It can be shown
that mi and Y (Ki, K−i) satisfy the following differential equation:
1
2










(Y (Ki, K−i), Ki, K−i) = 0. (3.15)
The function m(Y,Ki, K−i) represents the value of a perpetual American call option, where
the option has an exercise payoff of I, and a zero exercise price.
It can be easily verified that
∂π
∂Ki








The solution for Equation 3.9 is
m = BY λ1 +
2θ−2Y (ρθ + ρ)Kρθ−1
δ
. (3.17)
From the boundary conditions, we have
BY ∗λ1 +














= Y (t)2θ−2ρ(θ + 1)Kθρ−1. (3.20)





Then, substituting the expression for B into 3.18, we have
−2
θ−2(ρθ + ρ)Kρθ−1Y ∗
λ1δ
+
2θ−2Y ∗(ρθ + ρ)Kρθ−1
δ
= I, (3.22)












From a similar argument, we can also calculate the myopic trigger strategy when two
firms have different capital stock in the beginning (Ki 6= K−i).











The value of the firm: assets in place and growth options.
Our next goal is to solve Equation 3.9 with the boundary conditions. Given firm i’s
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The subscript is ignored since in equilibrium K1 = K2 = ... = Kn.
From the boundary conditions, we have
∂V
∂K
(Y ∗, K) = I (3.26)





Solving Equation 3.27, we have




= (I − ν2
θ−1ρθ
δ
)ν−λ1Kλ1(ρθ−1) = I(1− 2λ1θ
(λ1 − 1)(θ + 1)
)ν−λ1Kλ1(ρθ−1).




A′(k)dk = I(1− 2λ1θ
(λ1 − 1)(θ + 1)
)ν−λ1
1
λ1(ρθ − 1) + 1
Kλ1(ρθ−1)+1. (3.29)
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Therefor, firm i’s value can be expressed as
Vi = I(1−
2λ1θ
(λ1 − 1)(θ + 1)
)ν−λ1
1











λ1(ρθ − 1) + 1
)Kλ1(ρθ−1)+1Y λ1 = J(K)Y +E(K)Y λ1 , (3.31)
and the value of growth option is given by
Gi(K,Y ) = −I
2λ1θ
(λ1 − 1)(θ + 1)
ν−λ1(
1
λ1(ρθ − 1) + 1
)Kλ1(ρθ−1)+1Y λ1 = C(K)Y λ1 . (3.32)
3.3.2 A Preemption Strategy
To determine whether there exists a preemption strategy, I follow the approach in Paulsen
(2006). Suppose K10 = K20 = K0. If both firms were to play the myopic strategy defined
in Proposition 2, then both firms would always hold the same capacity and the expected
present value of the future cash flow would be given by
Vi = I(1−
2λ1θ
(λ1 − 1)(θ + 1)
)ν−λ1
1








Now consider the strategy for firm 1: invest K > K0 and keep this capacity constant
until time τ when K2 = K, then play the symmetric trigger. We assume firm 2 plays the
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myopic trigger and time τ is the first passage time of Y ∗(K,K).
From time τ on, both firms will hold the same capacities, thus firm 1’s expected payoff is
given by the value function V (Y ∗, K,K) discounted by e−rτ . Up to time τ , firm 1’s capacity
is fixed and only K2 increases. Firm 1’s expected profit is thus
W (Y,K,K2) = EY,K2 [
∫ τ
0
e−rt(π(Yt, K,K2)− rIK)dt+ e−rτV (Yτ , K,K)]. (3.34)
From the Feynman-Kac theorem, W (Y,K,K2) satisfies the ODE
1
2
σ2Y 2WY Y + (r − δ)WY − rW + (π(Y,K,K2)− rIK) = 0, (3.35)
subject to the boundary conditions
WK2(Y (K2, K), K,K2) = 0, (3.36)
W (0, K,K2) = −IK, (3.37)
and
W (Y (K,K), K,K) = V (Y (K,K), K,K). (3.38)





























To find A(K̄), we have to use the last boundary condition. First, we need to calculate
V (Y ∗(K̄, K̄), K̄). From the result we have in section 3.3.1,
Vi = I(1−
2λ1θ
(λ1 − 1)(θ + 1)
)ν−λ1
1











(λ1 − 1)(θ + 1)
)ν−λ1
1
λ1(ρθ − 1) + 1
K̄λ1(ρθ−1)+1. (3.43)
Since the integrals cannot be derived in the closed forms except for a few parameter
values, I evaluate the integrals numerically to find the expected payoff from the preemption
strategy.
Some numerical examples.
First, we set σ = 0.2, δ = 0.12, r = 0.12, I = 1, ρ = 1 and θ = 0.5. One can tell from
simple calculation (not shown here), λ1 = 3. This is actually the set of parameters in the
counter-example provided by Paulsen (2006), in which the products are perfect substitute.
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We then plot W (Y ∗(1, 1), K̄, 1) vs. K̄. It can be shown from Figure 3.1 that W (Y (1, 1), K̄, 1)
is increasing in K̄ up to a value greater than 1 and then decreasing. Following the argument
in Paulsen (2006), the symmetric trigger Y ∗(Ki, K−i) is not sub-game perfect, and it is
profitable for the firm to exercise the growth option early to preempt the second firm.
We then keep θ fixed and decrease ρ from 1 to 0.5. Figure 3.2 shows the preempting
value function W (Y (1, 1), K̄, 1) as a function of K̄. In addition, the preemption strategy
still exists but the local maxima is less than the case when ρ = 1. I also tried other values
of ρ and calculate W (Y (1, 1), K̄, 1) numerically. As long as ρ is positive and less than 1,
it is always profitable for one firm to deviate the conjectured strategy in Proposition 1 and
preempt if the other firm plays the conjectured strategy.
If θ = 0, then the utility of the representative customer is not well defined. However,
we can define the form of logarithm as U(q1, q2) ∼ log (qρ1 + q
ρ
2). Then the price can be





−1qρ−1i . Fig. 3.3 shows the expected profit W (Y (1, 1), K̄, 1)
from the preemption strategy as a function of K̄. Clearly, W (Y (1, 1), K̄, 1) is monotonically
decreasing when K̄ > 1. The myopic strategies form a Nash equilibrium. The result is not
surprising since Heston and Loewenstein have already proved in the perfect substitute case
that if the elasticity is one (when the representative customer has a utility in the form of
log (qi + q−i)), each firm is indifferent between waiting and preempting.
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Figure 3.1: ρ = 1, θ = 0.5
Figure 3.2: ρ = 0.5, θ = 0.5
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Figure 3.3: ρ = 0.5, θ = 0 (equivalent to the case in which the representative customer has
a log utility function.)
3.4 Linear Demand
3.4.1 The Open Loop Equilibrium
Now we study the case in which the inverse demand function is linear. The inverse demand
function is given by




The value of ρ,0 ≤ ρ = γ/β ≤ 1 measures the degree of product differentiation. When
ρ = 1, the goods are perfect substitute, when ρ = 0, the goods are independent, and when
ρ < 0, the goods are complements. Baldursson (1998), Grenadier (2002) and Back and
Paulsen (2009) all have studied the open loop equilibrium in an oligopoly setting with the
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assumption of linear demand. Our assumption is the same except that the products are not
homogenous.
Again, we assume that there exist two firms in the industry. The instantaneous profit
for firm i (i = 1, 2) can be expressed as
πi = Ki(Y − βKi − γK−i). (3.45)
In the symmetric equilibrium, Ki = K−i and π = Ki(Y − (β + γ)Ki).
Proposition 3.2: 1. The trigger strategy is given by
Y ∗(Ki, K−i) =
λ1δ(2βKi + γK−i + rI)
(λ1 − 1)r
. (3.46)
At equilibrium, Ki = K−i and we have
Y ∗(Ki) =
λ1δ[(2β + γ)Ki + rI]
(λ1 − 1)r
(3.47)
2. The value of marginal investment is given by
m(Yt, Ki, K−i) =
Yt
δ






(λ1 − 1)Y ∗λ1
Y λ1t . (3.48)
3. In the symmetric equilibrium, the value of firm i is given by


































We first calculate the marginal benefit
∂πi
∂Ki
= Yt − 2βKi − γK−i. (3.51)








and is subject to the boundary conditions:




The solution of m(Yt, Ki, K−i) takes the form of
m(Yt, Ki, K−i) =
Yt
δ
− 2βKi + γKj
r
+ AY λ1t . (3.55)
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From the boundary conditions (value matching and smooth-pasting), we have
Y ∗t
δ
− 2βKi + γKj
r






t = 0. (3.57)
By solving Equation 3.56 and 3.57, we find the trigger strategy Y ∗(Ki, K−i) andm(Yt, Ki, K−i)
as follows








m(Yt, Ki, K−i) =
Yt
δ




Y λ1t . (3.59)
We then need to find the value function of the firm Vi(Yt, Ki, K−i). The function Vi






+ (r − δ)∂Vi
∂Y




(Y ∗, Ki) = I, (3.61)
with π = Ki(Y − (β + γ)Ki) = Y Ki − (β + γ)K2i .
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The solution of Vi can be expressed as
Vi = C ∗ Y λ1 +
Y Ki
δ












− 2(β + γ)Ki
r
= I. (3.63)

















Y ∗(λ1 − 1)
δλ1
− I), (3.65)



























λ1δ(λ1 − 2)(2β + γ)
Y ∗−λ1+2. (3.68)
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r(λ1 − 1)(γλ1 − 2(β + γ))
(λ1 − 2)δ2λ21(2β + γ)2
Y ∗−λ1+2(Ki).
(3.69)





r(λ1 − 1)(2(β + γ)− γλ1)




3.4.2 A Preemption Strategy
To determine whether there exists a preemption strategy, I again follow the approach in
Paulsen (2006). Suppose K10 = K20 = K0. If both firms were to play the myopic strategy
defined in Proposition 2, then both firms would always hold the same capacity and the
expected present value of the future cash flow would be given by









Now consider the strategy for firm 1: invest K > K0 and keep this capacity constant
until time τ when K2 = K, then play the symmetric trigger. We assume firm 2 plays the
myopic trigger and time τ is the first passage time of Y ∗(K,K).
From time τ on, both firms will hold the same capacities, thus firm 1’s expected payoff is
given by the value function V (Y ∗, K,K) discounted by e−rτ . Up to time τ , firm 1’s capacity
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is fixed and only K2 increases. Firm 1’s expected profit is thus
W (Y,K,K2) = EY,K2 [
∫ τ
0
e−rt(π(Yt, K,K2)− rIK)dt+ e−rτV (Yτ , K,K)]. (3.72)
From the Feynman Kac theorem, W (Y,K,K2) satisfies the ODE
1
2
σ2Y 2WY Y + (r − δ)WY − rW + (π(Y,K,K2)− rIK) = 0, (3.73)
subject to the boundary conditions
WK2(Y (K2, K), K,K2) = 0, (3.74)
W (0, K,K2) = −IK, (3.75)
and
W (Y (K,K), K,K) = V (Y (K,K), K,K). (3.76)




− K(βK + γK2)
r
− IK + A(K,K2)Y λ1 (3.77)
since π(Y,K,K2) = K(Y − βK − γK2).
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∗λ1(K2, K) = 0. (3.78)
















(λ1 − 1)(2βK2 + γK + rI)λ1−1
,
(3.80)
which can be simplified into




(2βK2 + γK + rI)λ1−1
. (3.81)
From the last boundary condition, we can determine A(K):




(2βK + γK + rI)λ1−1
= C(K). (3.82)
Solving the equation, we find that
A(K) = C(K)− Kγ
2βλ1δ
1




I set r = 0.12, µ = 0, σ = 0.2 and it is easy to find that λ1 = 3 and λ2 = −1. I first
study the case in which β = 2, γ = 1.5 and the goods are imperfect substitute. In fig. 3.4,
I plot W (Y ∗(1, 1), K̄, 1) as a function of K̄. It is increasing in K̄ up to a value around 1.2
and then decreasing. Hence the symmetric trigger strategy Y ∗(Ki, K−i) is not firm i’s best
response to firm −i’s strategy. I also tried smaller value of γ (not shown here). No matter
how small γ is, as long as γ is positive, the function W (Y ∗(1, 1), K̄, 1) has a local maxima
at some K̄ which is greater than 1. This means that although product differentiation can
decrease competition among firms, the open-loop equilibrium is still not sub-game perfect
since pre-emption strategy exists for arbitrary positive γ values.
I then keep β = 2 and set γ = 0. This is the case in which goods are independent and
firms are monopolists. As we can see from fig. 3.5, W (Y ∗(1, 1), K̄, 1) has a slope of zero at
K̄ = 1 and is decreasing when K̄ > 1. This is expected since firms are monopolists and the
equilibrium strategies do not depend on other firms’ capacities.
Finally, I examine the case in which γ < 0 and the goods are complements. I set β = 2
and γ = −1. The value function W (Y ∗(1, 1), K̄, 1) of firm 1 preempting at Y ∗(1, 1) is shown
in fig. 3.6. Again, we find that W (Y ∗(1, 1), K̄, 1) has a local maxima at K̄ > 1. This
illustrates that even for the case of complimentary goods, each firm has an incentive to
preempt.
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Figure 3.4: β = 2 and γ = 1.5
Figure 3.5: β = 2 and γ = 0
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Figure 3.6: β = 2 and γ = −1
3.5 Conclusion
I develop a continuous time real option model in an oligopoly industry with heterogenous
products. I find that although the heterogenous products assumption lowers the incentive
for each firm to prematurely exercise the growth options, the preemption strategy is still





Proof of Lemma 1.2.1: It is easy to verify that







(1− κh)n′−nεv,τ . (A.1)
Taking expectations in Equation A.1, we have
E(vn′ |Imn ) = (1− κh)n
′−nE(vn|Imn ) + κhv̄(1− (1− κh)n
′−n+1). (A.2)




(1− exp (−rh)) exp (−r(n′ − n)h)((1− κh)n′−nE(vn|Imn ) (A.3)
+ κhv̄(1− (1− κh)n′−n+1))
=
(1− exp (−rh))
























(exp(−r(τ − n)h)(vτ − pn+2)) + ...
= xj,n ∗ (
+∞∑
τ=n




+ xj,n+1 ∗ (
+∞∑
τ=n+1




+ xj,n+2 ∗ (
+∞∑
τ=n+2











(1− exp(−rh)) exp(−r(n′ − n)h)(
n′∑
τ=n
xj,τ (vn′ − pτ ))|I in−1] = (A.6)
E[xj,n(
(1− exp (−rh))























exp(−r(n′ − n)h)( (1− exp (−rh))





Proof of Lemma 1.2.3: We first compute each component of the covariance matrix of
the vector (vn−1, yn) conditional on the market maker’s information set I
m
n−1:
cov(yn, vn−1|In−1) = cov(Mβ(vn−1 − ĝn−1), vn−1|In−1) = Mβvar(vn−1|In−1) = MβΣv (A.7)
var(yn|Imn−1) = M2β2Σv + σ2uh. (A.8)
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Then applying the projection theorem, we have
λ
1− κh




which can be reduced to equation (1.14).















The uncertainty of market maker’s posterior belief about gn is given by
var(vn|Imn ) = var((1− κh)ηn + εv,n) = (1− κh)2var(ηn) + σ2vh. (A.12)
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By stationary condition, we must have var(vn|Imn ) = Σv which leads to equation (1.15).
Proof of Lemma 1.2.4: From equations (1.1) and (1.12), market maker’s estimation
error on vn is
vn − v̂n = (1− κh)(vn−1 − v̂n−1)− λyn + εv,n. (A.13)
Substituting for vn − v̂n in equation (1.18), we find
V (vn−1, v̂n−1) = maxxi,n(xi,n((1− κh)(vn−1 − v̂n−1)− λ(xi,n +Xi−,n)) (A.14)




The first order condition yields
xi,n =
(1− 2e−rhBλ)(1− κh)(vn−1 − v̂n−1) + λ(2e−rhBλ− 1)Xi−,n
2λ(1− e−rhBλ)
. (A.15)
The second order condition requires that
e−rhBλ− 1 < 0. (A.16)
Because of symmetry argument, the only possible equilibrium is one in which their strate-
gies are identical. We should have Xi−,n = (M − 1)xi,n, which leads
xi,n =
(1− 2e−rhBλ)(1− κh)
λ(M(1− 2e−rhBλ) + 1)





λ(M(1− 2e−rhBλ) + 1)
. (A.18)
Substituting for xi,n back in the Bellman equation and matching the (vn−1 − v̂n−1)2 term
and constant term, we find
B = β[1− κh− λMβ] + e−rhB(1− κh− λMβ)2 (A.19)
which can be reduced to
B =
(1− κh)2(1− e−rhBλ)









Proof of Proposition 1.2.1:
First, we define q = e−rhλB and Z = e−rh(1− κh)2. From equation (1.20), we have
f(q) = 4M2q3 − 4M(M + 1)q2 + ((M + 1)2 + Z)q − Z = 0. (A.22)









(M + 1)3 + (9− 18M)Z +
√





(M + 1)3 + (9− 18M)Z +
√












(M + 1)3 + (9− 18M)Z +
√







(M + 1)3 + (9− 18M)Z +
√












(M + 1)3 + (9− 18M)Z +
√
((M + 1)3 + (9− 18M)Z)2 − ((M + 1)2 − 3Z)3






(M + 1)3 + (9− 18M)Z +
√
((M + 1)3 + (9− 18M)Z)2 + ((M + 1)2 − 3Z)3.
It can be easily verified that for M > 1, we have
f(0) = −Z < 0, f(1/2) => 0, f(1) = (M − 1)2 > 0. (A.26)




4(M + 1)2 − 2((M + 1)2 + Z)
2M
. (A.27)










< q3 < q4 < 1.
From the second order condition (equation (A.16)) we have q < 1. In addition, from
110
equation (1.19) any root that makes economically feasible must lie in the range q ∈ (0, 1
2
).
The only possible solution is q1. From equation (1.14) and equation (1.14), equation (1.19)























Then, from Equations (A.30, 1.14), (A.24), (1.21) and the expression for q1, we can derive
















Mσu(1− 2q1) + σu
. (A.33)
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Proof of Proposition 1.2.2: We first define









(M + 1)3 − 18M − 9 +
√





(M + 1)3 − 18M − 9−
√
((M + 1)3 − 18M − 9)2 − (M2 + 2M − 2)3.












+ Σ2v = Sv. (A.37)































Then, from equations (1.14), (A.28) and (1.21), we obtain the following asymptotic results





























Proof of Lemma 2.2.1: It is easy to verify that







(1− κh)n′−nεv,τ . (B.1)
Taking expectations in Equation B.1, we have
E(vn′|Imn ) = (1− κh)n
′−nE(vn|Imn ) + v̄(1− (1− κh)n
′−n+1). (B.2)




(1− exp (−rh)) exp (−r(n′ − n)h)((1− κh)n′−nE(vn|Imn ) (B.3)
+ κhv̄(1− (1− κh)n′−n+1))
=
(1− exp (−rh))
























(exp(−r(τ − n)h)(vτ − pn+2)) + ...
= xn ∗ (
+∞∑
τ=n




+ xn+1 ∗ (
+∞∑
τ=n+1




+ xn+2 ∗ (
+∞∑
τ=n+2











(1− exp(−rh)) exp(−r(n′ − n)h)(
n′∑
τ=n
xτ (vn′ − pτ ))|I in−1] = (B.6)
E[xn(
(1− exp (−rh))























exp(−r(n′ − n)h)( (1− exp (−rh))





Proof of Lemma 3.1: At period n, under the market maker’s belief, we have the joint
distribution of (vn−1, xn + zn + un)
′ conditional on her information set Imn−1
 vn−1





 Σv βΛv + (γ + θ)Ωv
βΛv + (γ + θ)Ωv β









βΛv + (γ + θ)Λv
β2Λv + (γ + θ)2Ωv + σ2uh
. (B.8)
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Applying the projection theorem to find the conditional variance, we have
var(ηn) = Σv −
(βΛv + (γ + θ)Λv)
2
β2Λv + (γ + θ)2Ωv + σ2uh
. (B.9)
From equations (2.1), market maker’s posterior belief about vn is
vn = (1− κh)v̂n−1 + κhv̄ + λ(xn + zn + un) + (1− κh)ηn + εv,n. (B.10)
The stationary condition requires that
Σv = (1− κh)2var(ηn) + σ2vh, (B.11)
which leads to Equation (2.18).
Proof of Lemma 2.3.2: Under the less informed trader’s belief, we have the joint
distribution of (vn−1, xn + un)


























Since the less informed insider observes a signal in the form sn = ρεv,n+
√
1− ρ2en, then
under the less informed insider’s belief,
εv,n = ρsn + ηs,t (B.15)
and
var(ηs,t) = (1− ρ2)σ2vh. (B.16)
Thus, the less less informed trader’s posterior belief about vn is
vn = (1− κh)v∗n−1 + κhv̄ + φ(xn + un − γ(v∗n−1 − v̂n−1)) + (1− κh)εn + ρsn + ηs,n. (B.17)
The steady state condition requires that
Λv = (1− κh)2(Λv −
β2Λ2v
β2Λv + σ2uh
) + (1− ρ2)σ2vh. (B.18)
Proof of Lemma 2.3.3: Using the results in section 2.3.2 and 2.3.3, we first compute
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the less informed trader’s estimation error of vn at period n
vn − v∗n = (1− κh)vn−1 + κhv̄ + εv,n − [(1− κh)v∗n−1 + κhv̄ (B.19)
+ φ(xn + un − γ(v∗n−1 − v̂n−1)) + ρsn]
= [1− κh](vn−1 − v∗n−1)− φ(xn + un)
+ φγ(v∗n−1 − v̂n−1) + εv,n − ρsn,
then compute the market maker’s estimation error relative to the less informed trader’s,
v∗n − v̂n = (1− κh)v∗n−1 + κhv̄ + φ(xn + un − γ(v∗n−1 − v̂n−1)) + ρsn (B.20)
− [(1− κh)v̂n−1 + κhv̄ + λ(xn + zn + un)]
= (1− κh− φγ)(v∗n−1 − v̂n−1)
+ (φ− λ)(xn + un)− λzn + ρsn,
and finally the market maker’s estimation error
vn − v̂n = (1− κh)(vn−1 − v̂n−1)− λ(xn + zn + un) + εv,n. (B.21)
Substituting for the above three equations into the Bellman equation (2.26), the more
119
informed trader solves the following problem:
V (vn, v
∗
n, v̂n) = maxxn{xn[(1− κh)(vn−1 − v̂n−1)− λ(xn + zn)] (B.22)
+ e−rh[A((1− κh)(vn−1 − v∗n−1)− φxn + φxγ(v∗n−1 − v̂n−1))2
+ A(φ2σ2uh+ (1− ρ2)σ2vh)
+ B((1− κh− φγ)(v∗n−1 − v̂n−1) + (φ− λ)xn − λzn)2
+ B((φ− λ)2σ2uh+ ρ2σ2vh)
+ C((1− κh)(vn−1 − v∗n−1)− φxn + φγ(v∗n−1 − v̂n−1))
× ((1− κh− φγ)(v∗n−1 − v̂n−1) + (φ− λ)xn − λzn)
− Cφ(φ− λ)σ2uh+ E]}.
After simplification, the first order condition of the better informed trader’s value function
with respect to xn is
2τxn = [1− κh− 2e−rhAφ(1− κh) (B.23)
+ e−rhC(φ− λ)(1− κh)](vn−1 − v∗n−1)
+ [1− κh− λθ − 2e−rhAφγ
+ 2e−rhB(φ− λ)(1− κh− φγ − λθ)
+ e−rhC(φ− λ)φγ − e−rhCφ(1− κh− φγ − λθ)](v∗n−1 − v̂n−1)
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and the second order condition is
τ = λ− e−rh(Aφ2 +B(φ− λ)2 − Cφ(φ− λ)) > 0. (B.24)
Rewriting the first order condition leads to the expression xn = β(vn − v∗n−1) + γ(v∗n−1 −
v̂n−1) with the β and γ defined in equations (2.27) and (2.29).
Substituting xn back into the Bellman equation, and by matching the coefficient of (vn−
v∗n−1) term, the (vn− v∗n−1)(v∗n−1− v̂n−1), the (v∗n−1− v̂n−1)2 term and the constant term, we
are able to setup the nonlinear equations (2.31 to 2.34) that determine A, B, C and E.
Proof of Lemma 2.3.4: We first substitute for expressions of v∗n− v̂n and vn− v̂n found




n−1, v̂n−1) = maxzn{zn[(1− κh− λγ)(v∗n−1 − v̂n−1)− λzn] (B.25)
+ e−rhF [(1− κh− λγ)(v∗n−1 − v̂n−1)− λzn]2
+ e−rhF [(φ− λ)2β2Λg + (φx − λ)2σ2uh
+ ρ2σ2gh] + e
−rhG}.
After simplification, the first order condition of the less informed trader’s value function
with respect to zn is
zn =
(1− 2e−rhλF )(1− κh− λγ)
2λ(1− e−rhλF )
(v∗n−1 − v̂n−1) (B.26)
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and the second order condition is
λ(1− e−rhλF ) > 0. (B.27)
Since the optimal strategy is assumed to be zn = θ(v
∗
n− v̂n) which is proportional to v∗n− v̂n,
we have
θ =
(1− 2e−rhλF )(1− κh− λγ)
2λ(1− e−rhλF )
. (B.28)
Substituting for zn = θ(v
∗
n − v̂n) back into the objective function and matching the
coefficients of the quadratic term (v∗n−1− v̂n−1)2 and the constant term, we are able to setup
the nonlinear equations (2.37) and (2.39) which determine F and G.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.2:
To study the asymptotic properties of the equilibrium for small h, we make the following
assumptions:
λ ' λ0 − a
√
h, (B.29)
φx ' φ0 − a
√
h, (B.30)











γ ' γ0 (B.35)
θ ' θ0 (B.36)
Substituting the asymptotic forms of λ, φ, Σv Λv, Ωv, and β into equation 2.17, we have
λ =
(γ0 + θ0)O + bL
(γ0 + θ0)2O + σ2u
, (B.37)










into Equation 2.37, we have
F = θ0(1− λ(γ0 + θ0)) + F0(1− λ(γ0 + θ0))2, (B.40)
B0 = γ0(1− λ(γ0 + θ0)) +B0(1− λ(γ + θ))2, (B.41)
and into Equation 2.29, we have
γ0 =




where τ0 = λ− φ+ A0φ2 −B0(φ− λ)2.
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Substituting the asymptotic forms into Equation 2.27, the constant term should equal to
zero which leads to
1− 2A0φ0 − C0(φ0 − λ0) = 0, (B.43)
and the
√
h term should equal to b
√
h, which leads to
b− A0a
λ0 − φ0 + A0φ20 −B0(φ0 − λ0)2
= 0. (B.44)
We then substitute the asymptotic expressions of β, λ, φx into equation 2.31, match the
coefficient of the
√
h term and reach the following equation:
−λb2 − (r + 2κ)A0 + 2A0ab+ Aφ2b2 − φb2C0(φ− λ) = 0. (B.45)
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